

Trust as a Second-Person Attitude (of the Heart)

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Introduction

- Responding to Baier.
- Trust need not contrast with reliance.
- Trust, but not reliance, can be betrayed.
 - Results in specific attitudes/feelings of being let down, disappointment etc.
- Resulting emotions do not occur in cases of mere reliance.
 - Already not sure if this is right. Maybe depends on the context of reliance?

Baier, Jones, and Holton on Trust: The Participant Stance

- Baier still ties reliance to trust.
- Trust as a “species of reliance.”
- Jones - Trust as the attitude of optimism towards someone else’s goodwill and competence.
- Both Baier’s and Jones’ accounts cannot explain trust’s connection to pain.

Baier, Jones, and Holton on Trust: The Participant Stance

- Jones adds the state of expectation to trust.
 - One can rely on someone else to instill trust.
- “Expectations that” - state how things will be
 - Expectations that take propositions or possible states of affairs as objects.
- “Expectations of” - states how someone should act.
 - Takes persons as objects (either groups or individuals).
- Both types of expectations impose standards

Baier, Jones, and Holton on Trust: The Participant Stance

- Expectations:
 - The only kind of expectation that one can live up to, is an “expectation of,” that cannot be reduced to an “expectation that.”
 - Not living up to someone’s expectation is to fail to meet the standard of what they think should happen.
 - If the expectational element of Jones’ account is to explain trust’s connection to attitudes associated with betrayal, then it must be an “expectation of”, rather than an “expectation that.”
- If Jones is giving an account of “expectations of,” then this is very close to Holton’s participant attitude.

Baier, Jones, and Holton on Trust: The Participant Stance

- Holton:
 - Trust - participant attitude held from the participant stance.
 - i.e., reliance from the participant stance.
 - “Hurt” as a Strawsonian reactive attitude.
 - Having these responses is a marker of the participant stance.
 - Strawson:
 - Participant stance is the standpoint of involvement or participation with others in inter-personal relationships.
 - For Darwall, participant stance = second-personal attitude.
 - “Implicit addressees”- these attitudes implicitly address their objects and invite (or demand) reciprocation in some way.
 - “Implicit RSVP”
- If Holton’s view holds:
 - Trust = second-personal attitude that we hold from the perspective of implied relationship to them.

Baier, Jones, and Holton on Trust: The Participant Stance

- Darwall's objective:
 - Elaborate trust as a second-personal attitude and to consider how trust differs from other second-personal attitudes.
 - Showing that the second-personal character of trust is present in Baier, Jones, and Holton.
- Promising:
 - "Directive," or "bipolar" obligations vs claim rights.
 - Promissory relations create bipolar obligations and claim rights.
 - Promising as a normative power.
 - Promisee has a certain authority.
 - Ability to hold promiser accountable / release from promise.
- Trust - similar structure to promising
 - Truster relates to trustee in certain ways
 - Can object / respond with reactive attitudes.

Deontic and Non-Deontic Participant Attitudes

- Resentment, blame, guilt:
 - Second-personal attitudes.
 - All deontic or juridical attitudes.
 - Implicitly make claims or demands.
 - Presuppose the authority to do so.
 - Hold their objects accountable for non-compliance.
- Trust ≠ deontic attitude.
 - Neither presupposes nor entails any authority to demand that the trusted act as they are being asked to act.
 - Also no authority to hold the trusted accountable.
 - Similar to love.
 - Trust and love do not make deontic demands.
- Question: How can any second-personal attitude truly be deontic?

Deontic and Non-Deontic Participant Attitudes

- Trust on its own does not presuppose any standing to make demands or hold it's object accountable.
 - Different in cases of betrayal of trust.
 - Blame and resentment may be involved here.
- Trust = second-personal attitude of the heart.
 - “Lay ourselves open” - Knud Ejler Løgstrup
 - Trust as involving vulnerability.
 - We are not impartial in trusting, as we are in blaming.
- Deontic accountability-seeking reactive attitudes come with “implicit RSVP.”
 - Implicitly call their objects to hold themselves accountable.
 - Ex. guilt.
- Second-personal attitudes as reciprocal attitudes.

Deontic and Non-Deontic Participant Attitudes

- Reciprocal Attitudes:
 - Shame as a reciprocal attitude of contempt.
 - Guilt, of blame.
- “Two attitudes, A and B, are reciprocals *iff*, for any persons X and Y, if Y is a fitting object of X’s attitude A, then B is an attitude it would be fitting for Y to have.” (42).
 - X’s contempt for Y is fitting *iff* it would be fitting for Y to feel shame.
 - Analogously; blame and moral guilt.
 - Guilt and blame reciprocate each other.
 - Natural expression might be apology / confession.
 - Shame does not reciprocate anything second-personal.
 - Fitting response might be to exclude oneself from social view.

Deontic and Non-Deontic Participant Attitudes

- Trust as non-deontic, but reciprocal.
 - Trust is a reciprocating attitude to itself.
 - Baseball card ex. (p.42).
- “Trust always necessarily invites trust in return” (42).

Trust in Contrast to Promising

- Related in many ways:
 - Both call for uptake
 - Both call for acceptance
 - If these things don't occur, then the relation is cancelled or rendered questionable.
- Promisees trust promisers to keep promises.
- Promiser/ee relation
 - Deontic
 - Relation of right
 - Promisers give promisees a claim right to what they have promised.
 - If the promise is broken, the promise acquires authority to hold the promiser accountable.
- Trust does not create these types of rights.
 - Promising creates an obligation where trusting does not.

Trust in Contrast to Promising

- Promising relations **do** involve trust.
 - Being an acceptor of an invitation to trust amounts to being promised something.
 - It could be the case that the obligation in promising relations can be accounted for by the fact that an invitation to trust is involved.
 - Inviting = second-personal transaction.
- Promises, trust, and invitations to trust.
 - All result in a second-personal relation to the person issuing the invitation.
- Different types of second-personal relations:
 - Promising involves a claim right.
 - Trust is not a relation of right.
 - One can refuse a promise but not reject trust.

Trust in Contrast to Promising

- Trust always implies or implicitly initiates some relation to the trusted.
 - Because of this, trust can be unwelcome or rejected.
- Kant's neighbors example (p.45):
 - By inviting his neighbors to trust, they have no right to expect him to hold to his habitual patterns, and resentment / blame are not justified in the case that he does not carry out these actions.
 - The neighbors only have the right *to trust* that he hold to his habitual patterns.
- This picture of trust involves some combination of second-personal attitudes from Baier, Jones, and Holton's accounts:
 - Optimistic attitude
 - Expectations
 - Motivation (for Kant) to act because he knows that he is being trusted.

Trust in Contrast to Promising

- There can always be ways of inviting trust that create deontic relations.
- Darwall claims that it is not possible to accept an invitation to trust without trusting.
 - “[...] nothing else could count as accepting such an invitation” (45).
- Truster/ee relation:
 - Personal
 - Both parties make themselves vulnerable personally, rather than juridically.

Trust as a Second-Personal Attitude of the Heart

- Trust = “[...] a species of second-personal attitude through which we lay ourselves open to others in a way that is distinctive of personal relationship and attachment” (46).
- “Attitude of the heart” in the metaphorical sense.
- Clearest parallel is “adult love”:
 - Reciprocation-seeking love as second-personal.
 - Seeks uptake and reciprocation
 - Love as non-deontic, non-juridical.
 - Cannot arise through acceptance of a claim for love.
 - “Quintessential attitude of the heart” (47).
- We can see that trust is a second-personal attitude of the heart by its implication in love.

Trust as a Second-Personal Attitude of the Heart

- Trust
 - A form of confidence in someone
 - A form of encouragement
 - On the other hand, also places expectations on the trustee.
- Reciprocal nature of trust:
 - When there is an invitation of trust, the person is invited to accept our trust, and trust in it.
 - They trust that we are trusting them.
- If we know that someone does not trust his/her/their self, it will be more difficult to trust that person.
 - We can still trust them, this might be encouraging to them?
 - When we trust in someone we invite them to trust in themselves too.
 - Further illustrates that this is an attitude of the heart.