In a popular comedy routine, Jerry Seinfeld describes a conflict of a sort that most people have experienced. Toying with the notion of personal identity, Seinfeld presents two distinct "selves," night Jerry and morning Jerry, which alternate possession f his body. Night Jerry, as the dominant personality in the evening, frequently makes decisions, for example staying out late, with negative consequences for morning Jerry. The suggestion, of course, is that people often make decisions that later prove egrettable. In real life, these decisions frequently involve accepting obligations which make claims on future actions. Such obligations range from the mundane, like agreeing to attend a social function, to the profound, as with the decision to have a cild. In most cases, we acknowledge both the right held by competent adults to take on debt or duty and the authority of society to enforce fulfillment of responsibility. However, even the most staunch advocates of individual liberty tend to deny one's rght to sell himself into slavery. John Stuart Mill, in his watershed defense of personal freedom, On Liberty, makes such a denial.
We shall herein examine whether Mill's rejection of the validity of "an engagement by which a person should sell himself . . as a slave,"(1092) proves tenable on his account of liberty. To this end, I shall first provide a brief account the basic principles espoused by Mill in On Liberty. Then, I will present the grounds on which Mill attempts to deny one's liberty to sll himself into slavery. With Mill's assertions in hand, I will raise several objections as to the consistency of his claims with the general theory presented in On Liberty, and, to a lesser extent, Utilitarianism. In the end, I believe, Mill's prohibitin of consensual servitude will reveal itself as incompatible with his notion of liberty.
Early in his essay, On Liberty, Mill expresses the basic notion of liberty which he seeks to defend. He intends to establish "that the only purpose for which power cn be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others. His own good, either physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant."(1038) In making this claim, Mill fails to attribute any intrinsic teeological value to liberty. Instead, he grounds his defense of liberty on the principle of utility, "that actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness, wrong as they tend to promote the reverse of happiness."(Utilitarianism 1110) Taen as a whole, Mill argues, actions expressing liberty tend to promote, while actions restricting liberty tend to reduce, general happiness. On the basis of this claim, Mill establishes two maxims.(1087) The first maxim states that an individual is not ccountable to society for his actions which concern only his own interests. The second maxim states that an individual may be held accountable only for his actions which are "prejudicial to the interests of others."(1087) Of particular relevance to topi at hand, Mill also asserts that the liberty of individual action, "implies a corresponding liberty in any number of individuals to regulate by mutual agreement such things as regard them jointly, and regard no persons but themselves."(1092) Thus, Mill llows for the protection of actions which concern persons other than the actor, so long as all parties consent to their involvement.
At this point we should note that, confined to this basic account, no prima facie grounds exist for denying one's right tosell himself into slavery. Of course, this is not to claim that the general institution of slavery finds protection under Mill's account, nor that ownership of another human being, even one who has consented, necessarily accords with this theory of libery. Instead, it is the act by which a person willingly consents to a life of servitude which, considered alone, seems to concern only that person and therefore falls outside the sphere with which society may, according to Mill, interfere. In the chapter cncerned with the applications of his theory, however, Mill attempts to justify society in "limiting one's power of voluntarily disposing of his own lot in life."(1092) In spite of the self-regarding nature of a person's consenting to live as a slave, Mil argues, the very concept of liberty precludes any claim to a right to act on such a choice. Mill's argument centers on the alienation of a person's liberty which necessarily accompanies his selling himself into slavery. This argument can be divided int two components. The first component deals with the immediate alienation of liberty, while the second concerns the interminable future alienation, both of which submission to slavery entails.
The first element of Mill's argument points out the contradicion involved in asserting that one has the right to sell himself into slavery. When a person exercises a right to some action, he makes a claim on society not to interfere with his performance of that action (except as needed for its own protection). Th ground for such a claim is liberty. As Mill points out, "the reason for not interfering . . . with a person's voluntary acts, is consideration for his liberty."(1092) Now, when a person appeals to a right to abdicate his freedom, he demands that societ acknowledge his freedom by not restricting this abdication. Herein lies the contradiction. One cannot invoke the value of a principle to justify abandoning that principle. In Mill's words, "it is not freedom to be allowed to alienate his freedom."(109)
The second component of Mill's argument concerns the long term implications of selling oneself into slavery. Even without regard to the fundamental contradictions involved with a right to alienate one's liberty, problems arise regarding any agreement iposing an interminable obligation. Granting that many of the debts and responsibilities that we undertake have a lasting character, it is difficult to conceive of any, save the current extreme example, which constitute an absolute surrender of freedom wihout any right of reconsideration. As Mill asserts, "there are perhaps no contracts or engagements, except those that relate to money or money's worth, of which one can venture to say that there ought to be no liberty whatever of retraction."(1092) Withthis, the notion that no contract should endure indefinitely without regard to any considerations that might arise, Mill essentially leaves this point. We may, however, take some liberty with the argument by suggesting a moderate extension of its claims. Once one accepts, as Mill suggests (1093), that no agreement precludes some set of circumstances under which its parties may be released from their obligation, new grounds for denying a right to sell oneself into slavery quickly arise. If considerations no matter how improbable, can arise by which any contract may lose its authority, no agreement can be considered interminable. The basis of an exchange by which someone sells himself into slavery, however, is the interminable nature of the agreement. Gven the fact that no contract can have this nature, society can forbid a person from selling himself into slavery on the grounds that doing so harms the buyer; he pays for a product that cannot exist.
In presenting objections to Mill's argument, I shal treat the two components as distinct. The challenge I will make to the first element will center on exposing a basic inconsistency upon which Mill's point rests. In dealing with the second element, I shall attempt to demonstrate both its logical errorsand indefensible conclusions.
The argument that "the principle of freedom cannot require that he should be free not to be free"(1092) has a great deal of intuitive appeal. After all, how can one appeal to the value of liberty to justify its alienation? he problem, however, arises with the recognition that, on Mill's theory, liberty has no intrinsic value. Instead, Mill makes explicit declaration, in both On Liberty and Utilitarianism, that utility is the only thing desirable as an end.(Util-1121) As uch, he admits that he must "forego any advantage which could be derived to my argument from the idea of abstract right, as a thing independent of utility."(1039) A principle of liberty, therefore, is defended only on the grounds that it tends to promotethe general happiness of humanity. This fact is illustrated by Mill's insistence that "liberty, as a principle, has no application to any state of things anterior to the time when mankind have become capable of being improved by free and equal discussion"(1039) Any value which Mill's theory may ascribe to liberty can be no more than instrumental and contingent. Neglect of this fact, and treatment of freedom as an end in itself, represents the fundamental error of the argument that liberty does not permt one to alienate his liberty. The recurrent use of the phrase "his liberty" evidences this problem. Liberty, as Mill initially defends it, is not a valuable thing which people possess, but is a principle which derives its value from its tendency to proote utility when applied to society as a whole. When one regards liberty as a principle which moderates social authority over individual behavior, rather than a commodity the personal possession of which is to be valued as an end in itself, no contradicton appears in the notion of liberty justifying one in selling himself into slavery.
When one chooses to become a slave, he does not give away or alienate his liberty. To claim otherwise is to presume that liberty is something belonging to an individual rather than a principle applying to society. As with all other actions, this principle bids society ask whether a sale of oneself into slavery will harm others. If the answer be negative, the principle bids society not to interfere. Now, in selling hmself into slavery, a person has neither forfeited nor alienated any of the protections afforded by the principle of liberty to members of society. Instead, this person, the slave, has taken on an obligation towards another person, the owner. The slave' actions are now limited, not because he has abdicated his liberty, which he has not, but because, by virtue of his obligation, the slave's actions have become prejudicial to the interests of another, the owner. In this, an account of liberty consistentwith Mill's grounds for its defense, no contradiction proves readily apparent.
The question remains, however, as to whether the peculiar permanence involved with a sale of oneself into slavery might constitute grounds for a limitation consistent with priciples of liberty. We must, of course, in considering the long term implications of such an arrangement take for granted the absence of any concomitant obligations which might complicate the equation. Further, on the basis of the above discussion, it sems reasonable to regard the choice to submit to lifelong servitude as an acceptance of an enduring responsibility rather than an abdication of liberty. With these considerations in mind, no element of Mill's theory would appear to justify limitations on he sorts of choices one may make based on the duration of the consequences entailed. On the contrary, the initial basis for Mill's defense of liberty of action rests on mankind's imperfect nature. Individuals are to be expected to make choices of both wsdom and folly, yet we can not presume to differentiate the two in every instance. This being the case, we cannot assume any sort of life to be necessarily preferable to the extent that we are warranted in prohibiting alternatives. Instead, being concered with the end of the greatest happiness, "the worth of different modes of life should be proved practically, when any one thinks fit to try them."(1065) Why should the mode of life defined by servitude be exempt from such a trial?
Enduring consequencs of actions cannot coherently count as grounds for their limitation on Mill's scheme. He defends liberty of choice with the claim that "individuality is the same thing with development."(1069) Individuality without consequence, however, represents a meningless concept. So long as one fails to harm others, the implications of his actions must be allowed to reach fruition. After all, both the wise choices which lead to personal happiness and the poor choices which bring individual misery provide a contibution to the general utility. This is the supposition behind the defense of diversity which underlies Mill's entire essay. For the sake of the development of humanity, "it is good there should be differences, even though not for the better, even thoug, as it may appear to them, some should be for the worse."(1075)
While mere considerations of the enduring nature of an obligation should not count in prohibiting its undertaking, the issue of whether the very nature of the slavery agreement constitutes anecessary harm deserves attention. The most readily apparent objection to this line of argument is that it begs the question. By presuming a state in which agreements cannot be held interminable, the argument improperly relies on a contingent circumstane in order to assert a necessary quality. Specifically, the argument bases the claim that one who sells himself as a slave harms the buyer due to the nature of such an exchange which depends on a contract's interminability in spite of the fact that no cotract can be regarded as interminable. The apparent circularity arises regarding the assumption that no contract can be interminable. This does seem to beg the question by supposing a system under which any agreement may be dissolved according to certai circumstances. Mill might deny this objection by claiming that he can, in constructing a cohesive system, presume the existence of it's elements in arguing for specific applications of principle. While this represents a legitimate claim, the response fils on the grounds that no element in Mill's account of liberty provides grounds for the dissolution of all agreements. In the absence of either real world or systematic necessity of the terminability of all contracts, the argument from harm fails by cirularity.