Articles on introspection, self-knowledge, and mindreading
 How mindreading misleads. In draft. COMMENTS WELCOME.
 Representing the mind as such in infancy. In draft. COMMENTS WELCOME.
 Is self-knowledge of belief transparent? In draft. COMMENTS WELCOME.
 Relationships between implicit and explicit uncertainty monitoring and mindreading: Evidence from autism spectrum disorder. (With Toby Nicholson, David Williams, Catherine Grainger, and Sophie Lind.) Consciousness and Cognition, 70 (2019), 11-24.
 Questions in development. In L. Butler, S. Ronfard, & K. Corriveau (eds.), The Questioning Child: Insights from psychology and education. CUP, 2019.
 Young children flexibly attribute mental states to others. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences (2018), 115, 11351-11353.
 Can you spot a liar? Deception, mindreading, and the case of autism spectrum disorder. (With David Williams, Toby Nicholson, Catherine Grainger, and Sophie Lind.) Autism Research, (2018).
 The illusion of conscious thought. Journal of Consciousness Studies 24, 9-10 (2017) 228-252.
 Are epistemic emotions metacognitive? Philosophical Psychology 30 (2017), 58-78.
 Mindreading in adults: evaluating two-systems views. Synthese, 194 (2017), 673-688.
 Pragmatic development explains the Theory-of-Mind Scale. (With Evan Westra.) Cognition, 158 (2017), 165-176.
 Two systems for mindreading? Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 7 (2016), 141-162.
 Perceiving mental states. Consciousness and Cognition 36 (2015), 498-507.
 Mindreading in infancy. Mind & Language, 28 (2013), 141-172.
 Mindreading the self. In S. Baron-Cohen, H. Tager-Flusberg, and M. Lombardo (eds.), Understanding Other Minds, Third Edition. OUP, 2013.
 On knowing your own beliefs. In N. Nottelmann (ed.), New Essays on Belief: Structure, Constitution and Content. Palgrave MacMillan, 2013.
 The evolution of self-knowledge. (With Logan Fletcher and Brendan Ritchie.) Philosophical Topics, 40 (2012), 13-37. (Published in 2014.)
 Metacognition and reasoning. (With Logan Fletcher.) Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences, 367 (2012), 1366-1378.
 The emergence of metacognition: affect and uncertainty in animals. (With Brendan Ritchie.) In M.Beran, J.Brandl, J.Perner, and J.Proust (eds.), Foundations of Metacognition. OUP, 2012.
 Introspection: divided and partly eliminated. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 80 (2010), 76-111.
 Introspection. (With Mark Engelbert.) Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Cognitive Science, 1 (2010), 245-253.
 Mindreading underlies metacognition. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32 (2009), 164-176. (A reply to 28 peer commentaries on #8 below.)
 How we know our own minds: the relationship between mindreading and metacognition. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32 (2009), 121-138.
 Action-awareness and the active mind. Philosophical Papers 38 (2009), 133-156.
 Cartesian epistemology: is the theory of the self-transparent mind innate? Journal of Consciousness Studies 15 (4) (2008), 28-53.
 The illusion of conscious will. Synthese, 159 (2007), 197-213.
 Conscious experience versus conscious thought. In U. Kriegel and K. Williford (eds.), Consciousness and Self-Reference. MIT, 2006.
 Autism as mind-blindness: an elaboration and partial defense. In P.Carruthers and P.K.Smith (eds.), Theories of Theories of Mind. CUP, 1996.
 Simulation and self-knowledge: a defense of theory-theory. In P.Carruthers and P.K.Smith (eds.), Theories of Theories of Mind. CUP, 1996.