Articles on introspection, self-knowledge, and mindreading

[32]  Model-free metacognition. (With David Williams.) Cognition, 225 (2022), 105117.

 

[31]  Explicit nonconceptual metacognition. Philosophical Studies, 178 (2021), 2337-2356.

 

[30]  Linking metacognition and mindreading: Evidence from autism and dual-task investigations. (With David Williams, Toby Nicholson, Catherine Grainger, and Sophie Lind.) Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 150 (2021), 206-220.

 

[29]  Representing the mind as such in infancy. Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 11 (2020), 765-780.

 

[28]  How mindreading might mislead cognitive science. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 27, 7-8 (2020), 195-219.

 

[27]  Relationships between implicit and explicit uncertainty monitoring and mindreading: Evidence from autism spectrum disorder. (With Toby Nicholson, David Williams, Catherine Grainger, and Sophie Lind.) Consciousness and Cognition, 70 (2019), 11-24.

 

[26]  Questions in development. In L. Butler, S. Ronfard, & K. Corriveau (eds.), The Questioning Child: Insights from psychology and education. CUP, 2019.

 

[25]  Young children flexibly attribute mental states to others. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences (2018), 115, 11351-11353.

 

[24]  Can you spot a liar? Deception, mindreading, and the case of autism spectrum disorder. (With David Williams, Toby Nicholson, Catherine Grainger, and Sophie Lind.) Autism Research, (2018).

 

[23]  The illusion of conscious thought. Journal of Consciousness Studies 24, 9-10 (2017) 228-252.

 

[22]  Are epistemic emotions metacognitive? Philosophical Psychology 30 (2017), 58-78.

 

[21]  Mindreading in adults: evaluating two-systems views. Synthese, 194 (2017), 673-688.

 

[20]  Pragmatic development explains the Theory-of-Mind Scale. (With Evan Westra.) Cognition, 158 (2017), 165-176.

 

[19]  Two systems for mindreading? Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 7 (2016), 141-162.

 

[18]  Perceiving mental states. Consciousness and Cognition 36 (2015), 498-507. 

 

[17]   Mindreading in infancy. Mind & Language, 28 (2013), 141-172.

 

[16]   Mindreading the self. In S. Baron-Cohen, H. Tager-Flusberg, and M. Lombardo (eds.), Understanding Other Minds, Third Edition. OUP, 2013.

 

[15]  On knowing your own beliefs. In N. Nottelmann (ed.), New Essays on Belief: Structure, Constitution and Content. Palgrave MacMillan, 2013.

 

[14]  The evolution of self-knowledge. (With Logan Fletcher and Brendan Ritchie.) Philosophical Topics, 40 (2012), 13-37. (Published in 2014.)

 

[13]   Metacognition and reasoning. (With Logan Fletcher.) Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences, 367 (2012), 1366-1378.

 

[12]   The emergence of metacognition: affect and uncertainty in animals. (With Brendan Ritchie.) In M.Beran, J.Brandl, J.Perner, and J.Proust (eds.), Foundations of Metacognition. OUP, 2012.

 

[11]   Introspection: divided and partly eliminated. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 80 (2010), 76-111.

 

[10]   Introspection. (With Mark Engelbert.) Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Cognitive Science, 1 (2010), 245-253.

 

[9]   Mindreading underlies metacognition. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32 (2009), 164-176. (A reply to 28 peer commentaries on #8 below.)

To access a copy of the complete BBS exchange, including #8& #9 together with the commentaries, click here.

 

[8]   How we know our own minds: the relationship between mindreading and metacognition. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32 (2009), 121-138.

 

[7]   Action-awareness and the active mind. Philosophical Papers 38 (2009), 133-156.

 

[6]   Cartesian epistemology: is the theory of the self-transparent mind innate? Journal of Consciousness Studies 15 (4) (2008), 28-53.

 

[5]   The illusion of conscious will. Synthese, 159 (2007), 197-213.

 

[4]   Conscious experience versus conscious thought. In U. Kriegel and K. Williford (eds.), Consciousness and Self-Reference. MIT, 2006.

 

[3]  Conscious thinking: language or elimination? Mind & Language 13 (1998), 323-342. Click here for pdf.

 

[2]  Autism as mind-blindness: an elaboration and partial defense. In P.Carruthers and P.K.Smith (eds.), Theories of Theories of Mind. CUP, 1996.

 

[1]  Simulation and self-knowledge: a defense of theory-theory. In P.Carruthers and P.K.Smith (eds.), Theories of Theories of Mind. CUP, 1996.