Miscellaneous articles


[7]    The bodily senses. (With Brendan Ritchie.) In M. Matthen (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Perception. Oxford University Press, 2013.


[6]    Inner sense. (With Vincent Picciuto.) In M. Matthen, M. Biggs, and J. Stokes (eds.), Perception and its Modalities. Oxford University Press, 2013.


[5]    What is Empiricism? Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, supp. vol. 64 (1990), 258-269.


[4]    Conceptual pragmatism. Synthese 73 (1987), 205-224.


[3]    Russellian thoughts. Mind 96 (1987), 18-35.


[2]    Eternal thoughts. Philosophical Quarterly 34 (1984), 186-204.


[1]    Fragmentary sense. Mind 93 (1984), 351-369.


Book reviews and commentaries


[15]     Cognitive instincts versus cognitive gadgets: A fallacy. (With Aida Roige.) Mind & Language (2019). Commentary on Cecilia Heyes, Cognitive Gadgets, Harvard University Press.


[14]     Young children flexibly attribute mental states to others. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences (2018), 115, 11351-11353. Commentary on Kiraly et al., Retrospective attribution of false beliefs in 3-year-old children. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences (2018).


[13]     Episodic memory isn’t essentially autonoetic. Behavioral and Brain Sciences (2018). Commentary on Johannes Mahr & Gergely Csibra, “Why do we remember?: The communicative function of episodic memory.”


[12]    Review of Inborn Knowledge: The mystery within, by Colin McGinn. Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews (May, 2016).


[11]     Review of Plato’s Camera: How the physical brain captures a landscape of abstract universals, by Paul Churchland. (With Brendan Ritchie.) Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews. (July, 2012.)


[10]   Descriptive Experience Sampling: What is it Good For? (With Mark Engelbert.) Journal of Consciousness Studies 18:1 (2011), 130-149.  (Commentary on Describing Inner Experience? by Russell Hurlburt and Eric Schwitzgebel.)


[9]   Simulation and the first person. Philosophical Studies 144 (2008), 467-475. (Commentary on Simulating Minds by Alvin Goldman.)


[8]    Review of Simulating Minds: the philosophy, psychology, and neuroscience of mindreading, by Alvin Goldman. Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews. (November, 2006.)  


[7]    Can panpsychism bridge the explanatory gap? (With Elizabeth Schechter.) Journal of Consciousness Studies, 13: 10-11 (2006), 32-39.  (Commentary on “Realistic monism: why physicalism entails panpsychism” by Galen Strawson.)


[6]    Review of Mindreading: an integrated account of pretence, self-awareness, and understanding other minds, by Shaun Nichols and Stephen Stich. Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews (September, 2004).


[5]    Review of Thinking without Words by José Bermúdez. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 55 (2004), 807-810.


[4]    Review of Recreative Minds: Imagination in Philosophy and Psychology by Gregory Currie and Ian Ravenscroft.  Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews (November, 2003).


[3]    Review of Human Nature and the Limits of Science by John Dupré. Economics and Philosophy, 18 (2002), 357-363.


[2]    Who is blind to blindsight? Psyche 7 (2001). (Commentary on The Significance of Consciousness by Charles Siewart.)


[1]    Review of What’s Within? Nativism Reconsidered by Fiona Cowie. Philosophical Books 40 (1999), 258-260.