Kane on

FREE WILL
and
DETERMINISM

Introduction

Ch. 1:
The problem of free will

- **Kane sums up what unites our various concerns about free will on pp. 5-6:**

    An event (such as a choice or action) is *determined* when there are conditions obtaining earlier (such as the decrees of fate or the foreordaining acts of God or antecedent causes plus laws of nature) whose occurrence is a sufficient condition for the occurrence of the event.

- **A sufficient condition *necessitates* what it's sufficient for, so this means that a determined event *must* occur, given the determining conditions.**

- **What concerns us, then, is the *inevitability* of our choices, given conditions that aren't "up to us." This seems to undermine the idea that we bear *ultimate responsibility* for what we do.**

A distinction to note

- **Early in his discussion (pp. 2f.) Kane distinguishes between two forms of freedom:**

    - **surface freedom(s): ability to satisfy your desires**

        - **e.g. to buy what you want, travel where you please, etc.**

        - **says nothing about where you got those desires, so compatible with manipulation by others (as in *Brave New World*, *Walden Two*, etc.)**

    - ***freedom of the will*: "being your own person," with control over your desires, in a sense that gives you ultimate responsibility for what you do**

- **In later chapters, Kane will argue that some accounts capture only surface freedom(s), or what he calls freedom of action, in contrast to free will.**

Illustrating the conflict with determinism

- **Kane gives the example of Molly (p. 6), who has to choose which of two law firms to join, a large firm in Dallas or a smaller firm in Austin.**

  - **To think it's worth deliberating about the choice, Molly must believe she has two "open" options. These amount to two possible paths into the future. (See the "Garden of Forking Paths" in Fig. 1.1, p. 7.)**

  - **But determinism implies that there's only *one* possible path into the future.**

Dallas vs. Austin ?

Molly

Questioning the conflict

- **However, most modern philosophers (and arguably also ancient philosophers) have held that the conflict is *illusory*: free will is logically compatible with determinism, if both ideas are understood correctly.**

- **As a result, there really are *two* issues about free will:**

  - **the Determinist Question: whether determinism is true**

  - **the Compatibility Question: whether determinism really conflicts with free will**

- **The Compatibility Question is the main focus of most philosophers' work on the subject, though it isn't recognized in popular thought, so you may have to work to avoid using the term "free will" in a way that rules out determinism just by definition. It's important to recognize the full range of views on free will, even if only to argue against those that deny the conflict with determinism.**

Question for thought/discussion

- In facing decisions like Molly's – about where to go to school, what to major in, etc. – wouldn't you still deliberate in the same way if you came to believe your decision was determined in advance, so that only one future path was possible for you?

- Isn't it enough that you wouldn't *know* which path you were determined to take? Wouldn't you try just as hard to think of reasons for one alternative or the other?

- Does that mean that the question of determinism really makes no difference to our practical reasoning (= deliberation about what to do), despite what Kane says about Molly? Or is there some other way that determinism might affect your decision-making?

Kane's two conditions

- **Kane enumerates two conditions implied by free will that might be thought to be undermined by determinism (p. 6). His wording makes them sound pretty similar, but he later makes much of the difference between them, under the headings I've indicated:**

    1) it's "up to us" what we choose and how we act, i.e. we could have chosen or acted otherwise = **AP (Alternative Possibilities)**.

    2) The ultimate sources of our actions lie in us and not outside us in factors beyond our control **= UR (Ultimate Responsibility)**.

- **These are essentially a libertarian's answers to the question of what difference determinism would make – at least to how we think of our acts and ourselves and other agents in retrospect, even if we'd still deliberate in the same way.**

The relevance of modern science

- **In the twentieth century the Laplacian/Newtonian deterministic model of physics has been replaced by quantum indeterminacy.**

- **This might seem to eliminate worries about free will vs. determinism, but they persist for several reasons:**

  - quantum indeterminacy is disputed and might eventually be brought under a larger, deterministic system

  - quantum effects are usually insignificant in large physical systems such as the human brain and body

  - quantum leaps would be chance events, so they wouldn't involve the element of control over action that characterizes free will and responsibility

  - developments in sciences other than physics (e.g. neuroscience, evolutionary biology) have tended to favor a more deterministic picture of human action

Considering Compatibilism

Ch. 2:
Classical Compatibilism

- The version of compatibilism favored by modern philosophers such as Hobbes, Locke, Hume, and Mill takes the ordinary meaning of freedom as:

  1. the power or ability to do what we want, and hence

  2. the absence of constraints or impediments to action such as physical restraint, coercion, lack of opportunity, or compulsion.

- Instead of forking paths into the future, they offer a conditional or **hypothetical analysis** of free will (or "can," i.e. "could have done otherwise"), as meaning essentially that

  – you would have done otherwise *if* you chose to – and

  – you would have *chosen* otherwise if you *wanted* to

- The second clause essentially reapplies the hypothetical analysis to the condition in the first clause. Without it, the analysis could capture only surface freedoms, not the deeper freedom that Kane identifies with free *will*.

The compatibilist's argument (1)

The first half of the argument for compatibilism, as Kane presents it, is an attack on the incompatibilists' supposedly "deeper" notion of *free will*. I would analyze the argument as follows:

1. Suppose there were an alternative to the hypothetical analysis.

2. The alternative analysis would allow for different possible futures with the same past, so that Molly (in the case presented earlier) would be able to go through the very same deliberation that leads her to choose the law firm in Dallas and yet choose the Austin firm instead.

3. But if it goes against prior deliberation, a choice like Molly's would be rationally incoherent.

4. So the alternative analysis would be incoherent.

5. So the hypothetical analysis is the only coherent interpretation of free will.

Questions for thought/discussion

- **Do you see any problems with the preceding argument?**

- **One possible objection to the inference to step 4 is that an *analysis* of an ability might be coherent even if an *exercise* of the ability would not be.**

- **That is, the irrationality or incoherency of what Molly would do if she did otherwise doesn't imply that the claim that she could do it is incoherent.**

- **Are there other steps in the argument that might be questioned?**

The compatibilist's argument (2)

- **The second half of the argument attacks incompatibilists' understanding of *determinism*, as confusing determinism with one or more of the following:**

  - **constraint, coercion, compulsion (causes that force us to act *against* our will, in contrast to the laws of nature) [= Kane's 1-2]**

  - **control by other agents (in manipulation cases; cf. also psychosurgery, etc.)**

  - **fatalism (including inability to alter one's character; cf. also Mill's "lazy sophism," p. 20)**

  - **mechanism (making us like robots or animals, acting automatically, without conscious reflection or flexible response)**

- **The point is that the causes of action work *via* our will (desires, choices, etc.). Hume even noted that responsibility *requires* causation by our characters and motives (pp. 18f.).**

"Soft" Determinism

- **Kane also notes that the combination of compatibilism and determinism is often called "soft determinism." That's because compatibilism softens the impact of determinism on free will and responsibility.**

- **Kane's two questions (of determinism and compatibilism) thus yield four classical positions on free will vs. determinism, though only three have names:**

    - *soft determinism* **(determinism + compatibilism)**

    - *hard determinism* **(determinism + incompatibilism)**

    - *libertarianism* **(indeterminism + incompatibilism)**
      [assuming free will compatible with *in*determinism – denied by some contemporary incompatibilists]

    - *????* **(indeterminism + compatibilism)**

The classical positions in matrix form

determinism + compatibilism = **soft determinism**	indeterminism + compatibilism = **????**
determinism + incompatibilism = **hard determinism**	indeterminism + incompatibilism = **libertarianism** **[assuming free will compatible with *in*determinism]**

Ch. 3:
The Consequence Argument

Kane now turns to analysis of an important recent argument *against* compatibilism, Van Inwagen's "Consequence Argument." Here's a modified version of Kane's steps 1-6 on pp. 23-24:

1. **No one can now change the past.**

2. **No one can now change the laws of nature.**

3. **[1 & 2 combined]**

4. **[If determinism is true,] our present acts are the necessary consequences of the past and the laws of nature.**

5. **[If determinism is true,] we can't change the fact that [the consequent of] 4 holds.**

6. **[If determinism is true,] we can't change our present acts.**

Explaining the argument

- **Steps 5 and 6 in the argument depend on two rules of inference (again reworded a bit):**

  - *Rule Alpha*: You can't change what's necessary.

  - *Rule Beta* (the "Transfer of Powerlessness Principle"): If you can't change X, or the fact that Y is a necessary consequence of X, then you can't change Y.

- **Rule Alpha seems intuitively obvious, and Kane gives examples (p. 26) to show that Rule Beta is plausible:**

  - If we can't prevent the sun from exploding in 2050, or the fact that its explosion will end all life on earth, then we can't prevent the end of life on earth in 2050.

  - If the laws of nature entail that nothing can exceed the speed of light, then since we can't do anything about that, we can't change the fact that nothing can exceed the speed of light

Criticizing the argument

- **However, classical compatibilists might question Rule Beta and the move to step 6 in the Consequence Argument by using the hypothetical analysis of "can" to analyze claims about what we "can't" change.**

  - **On the one hand, you couldn't change the past or the laws of nature – or the fact that they have your present acts as their necessary consequence, if determinism is true – even if you now chose or wanted to.**

  - **But on the other hand, you *could* change your present acts if you now chose or wanted to.**

- **This shows that, on the interpretation favored by classical compatibilists, 3-4 would come out true while 6 comes out false, so that the inference to step 6 that's licensed by Rule Beta would be *invalid,* along with the argument as a whole.**

An incompatibilist counterattack

- **But the hypothetical analysis itself is subject to criticism. It seems to have counterintuitive implications as applied to cases of special disabling causes.**

- **Consider McKenna's case of Danielle, who can't tolerate blond Labrador retrievers because of a traumatic childhood experience.**

  - **Intuitively, it seems that she's *unable* to touch the blond lab in a pair of dogs that's presented to her, because she's unable to *want* (i.e. form a desire) to do so.**

  - **But the hypothetical analysis as explained in ch. 2 would seem to tell us that she's *able* to touch it, given that she would touch it *if* she chose to, and that she would choose to *if* she wanted to.**

A compatibilist response?

- **Suppose the compatibilist tried to capture Danielle's inability by reapplying the hypothetical analysis to Danielle's being *able to want* to touch the dog, i.e. to satisfy the antecedent (if-clause) of the second application of the analysis as distinguished in ch. 2, which here gives us:**

  If she wanted to choose to touch the dog, Danielle would choose to.

- **An analysis of "Danielle *could* want to choose to…" would yield a further conditional that comes out *false.* Kane just repeats "wanted to," but it might be something like**

  If she recognized a reason to want to choose to touch the dog, Danielle would….

A regress

- **However, that last statement would be *true* of a normal agent in Danielle's position, i.e. one who *is* able to touch the dog – and to choose to and to want to choose to.**

  If X recognized a reason to..., he *would* want to....

- **However, couldn't further questions be raised about whether a given agent X is *able* to recognize a reason to...? To answer them, we'd presumably have to apply the hypothetical analysis yet again.**

- **Since further questions might be raised at the next stage, and so on *ad infinitum*, the attempt to replace all claims of ability with hypotheticals generates an infinite regress. So we'd never manage to complete the analysis of ability.**

Defending Libertarianism

Ch. 4:
The Libertarian Dilemma

- **Libertarianism (~compatibilism + free will = ~determinism) has its own problems, however. It seems that either**

  1. **our acts are determined by our pre-existing character and motives, which would mean we can't accept incompatibilism if we count any of them as free, or**

  2. **our acts are undetermined, so they occur without the agent's control , which would mean we can't count any acts as free.**

- **This constitutes a dilemma in the strict sense (from logic) involving a choice between unacceptable alternatives – in this case, unacceptable to a libertarian.**

- **A response to a dilemma would need to show either that one or both of the alternatives (the "horns" of the dilemma) isn't really a problem or that there's some further possibility besides these two (thus "escaping between the horns" of the dilemma).**

Incompatibilist Mountain

- **In Kane's image (p. 34) of "Incompatibilist Mountain," either you can't get up the mountain (to incompatibilism) or you can't get down (to indeterminist free will).**

- **Getting down amounts to solving "the Descent Problem": explaining how indeterminist free will is intelligible.**

- **In more abstract terms, the problem is how to reconcile free will with Kane's "Indeterminist Condition," granting an agent the ability both to act and to act otherwise [= AP], given the same circumstances and the laws of nature.**

[INCOMPATIBILISM]

The Ascent Problem:
Is free will incompatible
with determinism?

The Descent Problem:
Can we make sense of
and affirm an indeterminist
free will?

[COMPATIBILISM]   [LIBERTARIAN
   FREE WILL]

The intelligibility ("Descent") problem

- An undetermined event (whether an act, a choice, the firing of a neuron in the brain, or a quantum event) would seem to be one that happened just by chance.

- But that means the agent would have no control over it.

- So it would be unfair to hold him morally responsible for it or its results (e.g. to blame him for an act that's morally wrong).

- But if freedom is understood to support moral responsibility (assuming other conditions are met, e.g. the agent knows what he's doing), then it follows that an undetermined act couldn't exhibit free will.

- So it looks as though indeterministic free will makes no sense.

Kane's illustration

Kane uses a variant of his earlier case of Molly to show how indeterminist free will gives rise to a problem for rational coherency.

- Here we have **Mike**, who has to choose between vacationing in Hawaii vs. Colorado.

- Even if Mike's deliberation merely *inclines* him toward the choice of Hawaii (rather than necessitating it), his choice of Colorado would still seem to be inexplicable, arbitrary, incoherent, etc.

Hawaii
vs. ?
Colorado

Mike

The "Luck Objection"

Bad

John

Good

John*

Similar cases are used to pose problems for moral responsibility, such as Mele's case of John and his counterpart in another possible world, John*, who share the same "powers, capacities, states of mind, moral character and the like" up to the moment when each makes a different choice, as allowed by libertarianism.

– **In a particular situation, John yields to temptation and arrives late to a meeting, whereas John* resists temptation and arrives on time.**

– **It seems to be just a matter of luck which choice each agent made. But then isn't it unfair to punish John and reward John*?**

Ch. 5:
Traditional responses

- **Historically, libertarians have tried to answer such problems by employing the "*extra-factor strategy*," positing some further factor outside the world of science, as an indeterministic cause or type of causation, e.g.**

  - *the mind*, **conceived as a separate substance from the body (mind/body dualism, as in Descartes)**

  - *the noumenal self*, **as distinct from the phenomenal self (with only the latter subject to the laws of nature, or explicable by science and reason, as in Kant)**

  - *agent-causation*, **as a different kind of causal relation ("immanent," rather than "transeunt," or between events, as in Chisholm)**

- **However, in each approach it's unclear how the extra factor can operate in a way that avoids the same problems, i.e. versions of the problem of arbitrariness or luck as in the cases of Molly, Mike, and John/John*.**

Agent-causation

- **Though mind/body dualism persists in popular thought, agent-causation is the extra-factor approach that's still favored by a number of libertarian philosophers in the current debate.**

- **What's "extra" here is not an entity, but rather a different type of causal relationship: a free act is caused by the agent, as a substance continuing over time, rather than by prior events, circumstances, states of affairs, etc., including those happening or pertaining to the agent.**

  - **But this simply stipulates that events are not the causes.**

  - **And as with the other extra-factor strategies, we can just direct questions of randomness, arbitrariness, luck, etc., toward an event *involving* the new factor: the agent's *causing* his action.**

Another regress

- Chisholm responded to the question of randomness by positing a further level of agent-causation, in which the agent caused his agent-causing of a certain act.

- But of course the question could be raised again at this level: was the agent's causing his agent-causing random? Chisholm was willing to accept an infinite regress here, with repeated applications of agent-causation.

- Others preferred to say that agent-causation is nonrandom by its very nature, since it amounts to conscious control.

- But this response makes the view *doubly* stipulative: it just lays down or stipulates that agent-causation (1) isn't reducible to event-causation and (2) involves control by the agent. Without telling us anything about the *mechanism* of control, it's as mysterious as the other extra-factor strategies.

Ch. 6:
Reasons vs. causes

- **A more contemporary response to the libertarian dilemma due to Ginet posits no extra factors to explain free action and hence is called "simple" indeterminism.**

- **Instead of a different type of causation, it introduces a different type of explanation *besides* causation: everyday explanation by reasons and purposes.**

  - **Reasons and purposes are commonly cited in answer to "why?" questions about actions, with actions initially distinguished from mere happenings by the way they feel: their "actish" phenomenal (= experiential) quality.**

  - **Ginet understands purposes <to bring about some end or object of desire> as "contents" of intentions [= the mental states we're in when doing something "on purpose"].**

  - **In other words, purposes are what intentions are *about.* Since purposes can themselves refer to desires, intentions serve to link desires to action, even in the absence of a deterministic causal connection.**

Connecting intention and desire

For example, suppose that the answer to why Mary entered the room is a reason: "to find her keys."

- A **causal (desire/belief) theorist** would say that Mary's action was caused by her desire to get the keys, in combination with her belief that they were in the room (or that she could get them *by* entering the room).

- Ginet would instead explain Mary's action by her intention **referring to** the relevant desire: <to enter the room in order to satisfy the desire to find her keys>.

Mary

Problems with the account

- **So Ginet's model attempts to answer the problem of arbitrariness by exhibiting a mental state of the agent, an intention, that connects action to desire.**

- **But Ginet tells us nothing about how the intention to act arises. or how it gives rise to action. He simply says that what initiates action is an uncaused mental event called a** *volition* **(= act of will).**

    - **Kane also notes that** *unconscious* **purposes might give rise to action without entering into the content of the agent's intentions. An example might be Mary's unconscious desire to wake up her brother by entering the room.**

    - **Moreover, we might be deluded about whether a particular bodily movement that feels "actish" is really an act, as opposed to a result of an impulse implanted in us.**

Questions for thought/discussion (a)

- **Are Kane's objections really decisive against Ginet?**

  - **Couldn't some special cases of "actish" events be caused, whereas normal actions are not?**

  - **If an intention is caused along with them (cf. post-hypnotic suggestion), they might still count as actions, but just not free .**

  - **Could we also say something similar about unconscious purposes – and/or that intentions too can sometimes be unconscious?**

- **On the arbitrariness question: couldn't Ginet say that *intentions* are explained by desires – even causally – as long as they don't cause *action*? But how would he handle Mike's case (of acting against the results of deliberation), which Kane brings up only later in the chapter?**

Reintroducing agent-causation

- O'Connor thinks we need to refer to an agent-cause in order to explain where an *intention* (or a volition) came from, if it wasn't determined by prior events.

- In answer to Goetz's charge of mere stipulation, he claims that agent-causation serves to assign choice a complex structure, distinguishing it from a mere happening:

  An agent (A) brings about some event or state of affairs (e).

- O'Connor argues that this structure implies that choices can't be causally determined, since the structure contains no prior event that could be caused (pp. 58-60).

- But Kane points out that the same structure extends to all action, including cases of *unfree* action, such as cases of coercion or compulsion. So it can't prove anything about determinsm [assuming that unfree acts *are* determined].

Mixing agent- and event-causation

- **Another current libertarian, Clarke, suggests supplementing an indeterministic version of the causal theory of action with agent-causation.**

  - **Even if we reject the simple indeterminist's distinction between desires as causes and reasons or purposes, the causes of action might just be probabilistic, inclining without necessitating.**

  - **To avoid the charge of arbitrariness, however, and assign control to the agent, we need to add in agent-causation as what "tips the balance" when the agent makes a choice *other than* the one his reasons incline him toward (as in Kane's earlier case of Mike).**

- **But Kane notes, along with Ginet and O'Connor, that this apparently represents the agent as operating outside the natural order of events (p. 63). So we're back to our original worries about introducing a mysterious extra factor to explain how the agent could do otherwise.**

Confining arbitrariness to deliberation

- **Another strategy that Dennett and Mele have suggested on behalf of libertarians would be to *accept* an element of arbitrariness, but for thought rather than action.**

  - Some of the thoughts that occur to an agent as he weighs the pros and cons of his options may be undetermined and hence arbitrary, but his acts or choices aren't themselves arbitrary, as long as they're determined *by* whatever thoughts occur to him.

  - This combination of indeterminist and determinist elements might be thought of as "*event-causal libertarianism*." (They also suggest "causal indeterminism," but that's ambiguous.)

- **However, Kane says this doesn't really give the agent *control* over what happens at *either* stage, of thought (understood as undetermined) or action (assumed to be determined).**

- **So we still haven't managed to make sense of libertarian free will, in answer to Kane's "Descent Problem."**

Questions for thought/discussion (b)

- **Thinking further about Mike's case: could we just acknowledge that Mike *would* be irrational if he "did otherwise" than he concluded he should on the basis of prior deliberation (weighing reasons, etc.)?   After all, we sometimes are irrational.**

- **But bear in mind that libertarian views are meant to allow for blameworthiness in morally serious cases. Consider a hit-man or assassin (a case Kane will bring in later, in different versions) who deliberates to the conclusion that he ought to shoot the prime minister – not on moral grounds but to fulfill his mission and earn his pay.**

- **We want to hold him responsible for stressing his own advantage over moral reasons he's aware of. But can we blame someone whose only other option is irrational?**

Doing without Free Will

Ch.7:
Skepticism about free will

- **The view that's usually known as "hard determinism" involves *denying* free will and responsibility.**

- **Even someone from a basically normal upbringing who commits a major crime, e.g. Timothy McVeigh, couldn't be considered morally blameworthy on this approach.**

- **Kane thinks of it as a "cold" view, since it leaves you at the top of Incompatibilist Mountain, having established incompatibilism but unable to make sense of free will.**

- **A broader contemporary version of the view that's been labeled "hard incompatibilism" (Pereboom) remains agnostic about determinism.**

- **Instead, this skeptical position just accepts the Libertarian Dilemma as irresolvable and holds that libertarian free will is impossible *with or without* determinism, because undetermined choices would occur by luck or chance.**

(Galen) Strawson's "Basic Argument"

In simplified form, the Basic Argument for hard incompatibilism runs as follows:

1. We act as we do because of our character.

2. If you were truly responsible for an act, you'd have to be responsible for the character that led to it.

3. But if you were truly responsible for your character, you'd have to be responsible for an act you did in the past that played a role in creating it.

4. But then step 2 would reapply to that past act.

5. But then step 3 would reapply to your character at that earlier time.

   ...and so on until we get back to a time, in early childhood, when you obviously couldn't have been responsible for your character. [The unstated conclusion is that we're not responsible for our acts (denying the antecedent of step 2).

Responding to the Basic Argument

- **Though he grants that all premises of the Basic Argument seem plausible, Kane says that a compatibilist or libertarian would object that we can *change* our original characters, even if we didn't create them.**

- **[Kane apparently takes this objection just as challenging the inference from steps 1-5 to the conclusion that we're not responsible for what we do (see p. 73). However, it would also seem to undermine steps 1-2, since it implies that not all our acts result from our *pre-existing* character.]**

- **However, Strawson would reply as follows:**

  – **If the way we change our characters is determined by who we already are (as compatibilists hold), then we're not responsible for it.**

  – **If the way we change our characters is *un*determined by who we are (as libertarians hold), then it occurs by luck or chance, and again we're not responsible for it.**

Questions for thought/discussion

- **Are there other ways of responding to the Basic Argument?**

- **Is step 2 really obvious? Even if our character is the result of external causes, isn't the fact that it's *our* character enough to make us responsible for the acts that it causes, assuming it was instilled in a way that allowed us the ability to change it on the basis of critical reflection?**

  - **The assumption is meant to rule out inflexible aspects of character due to serious mental illness, congenital brain damage, or rigid indoctrination or abuse, etc., in childhood.**

  - **It wouldn't matter to this approach if we thought of *normal* upbringing as a deterministic cause of our characters – and of what we actually do (if anything) to change them. So this approach fits better with compatibilism than with what Kane is suggesting.**

Contenting ourselves with unfreedom

- **"Optimistic" versions of hard incompatibilism maintain that the quality of our lives wouldn't really suffer much if we denied free will.**

  - Honderich grants, in contrast to compatibilism, that we'd have to give up the idea that we're ultimately responsible for whether our "life-hopes" are fulfilled, so our self-image would suffer: we could no longer be proud of our achievements, etc., in the same way

  - However, we could retain the everyday life-hopes that make life meaningful (success, love, etc.); we'd still strive to realize them, since we could never *know* whether they were going to be fulfilled. [But cf. active vs. passive attitudes.]

  - Following Nietzsche, one might even hold that the loss in self-image would make our lives more positive, healthy, and honest.

- **In place of retributive punishment, moreover, with its basis in a notion of "desert," we could call upon other motives for punishment such as deterrence, reform or rehabilitation, etc.**

Is free will a necessary illusion?

- **Pereboom extends the optimistic approach by**

  - interpreting punishment as analogous to quarantine (but then we face problems about unfairly punishing dangerous individuals who haven't yet committed any crime)

  - arguing that we'd still place a value on love, and retain our admiration for generous or heroic deeds, along with various other "reactive attitudes," e.g. gratitude (but not blame or guilt)

- **But Smilansky's more pessimistic view maintains that we need to leave the illusion of free will in place, since**

  - without it morality would be undermined, since people wouldn't hold themselves responsible in the same way (by feeling guilty for wrong action, etc.)

  - it's also essential to our own sense of achievement and self-respect [and motivation?]

Questions for thought/discussion

- **Even if you're not a hard incompatibilist, how do you stand on optimism vs. pessimism? Would we lose anything of great significance if we denied free will? How would the loss affect our view of ourselves and our treatment of others – not just criminals but also the people with whom we form relationships? Would moral motivation be undermined?**

- **Do you have a favored view of free will at this point, now that versions of all the main traditional views are on the table?**

  - **compatibilism (with or without determinism)**

  - **hard determinism (or possibly hard incompatibilism)**

  - **libertarianism (with or without "extra factors")**

- **If you accepted a different view when the course began, what changed your mind?**

Contemporary positions

determinism + compatibilism = **soft determinism**	indeterminism + compatibilism = **????**
determinism + incompatibilism = **hard determinism** *as a subtype of* *hard incompatibilism*	indeterminism + incompatibilism = **libertarianism** **+ hard incompatibilism** *the indeterminist version*

Reformulating Compatibilism

Ch. 8:
Free will without alternatives

- **Nowadays many philosophers just *define* "free will" as whatever sort of freedom is required by responsibility.**

- **Some, known as "the new compatibilists," also challenge the standard view (as assumed in the Consequence Argument for incompatibilism) that free will involves the ability to do otherwise.**

    - **They deny what Frankfurt calls the "Principle of Alternative Possibilities" (PAP) for responsibility = (AP) for free will.**

    - **Dennett supplies some "character-examples," e.g. the case of Luther. When he said "I can do no other," Luther clearly didn't mean to avoid taking responsibility for his refusal to recant the 99 theses.**

    - **For another example: if he (Dennett) were offered $1,000 to torture an innocent person, he couldn't bring himself to do it, but that doesn't mean he wouldn't be responsible for rejecting the offer.**

Frankfurt-type examples

- **Kane thinks Dennett's "character-examples" depend on the assumption that the agent was responsible for earlier choices that created his character – so he'd accept PAP for that earlier time.**

- **He therefore turns to a type of example associated with Harry Frankfurt but derived from 17th-century philosopher John Locke:**

  - **Locke's case involves a man locked in a room who chooses to stay for some reason of his own (e.g. to continue his conversation) and thus is responsible for the choice, even though he actually had no alternative to staying in the room.**

  - **He did have an alternative to *choosing* to stay, though; so some would say *that's* why he's responsible (for staying, as well as for choosing to stay).**

  - **Frankfurt therefore substitutes a case of his own, meant to rule out alternative possible *choices*.**

The case of the hypothetical controller

In Frankfurt's case, what prevents the agent even from choosing to do otherwise is something merely hypothetical:

– Black is set to make Jones choose A if Jones didn't choose A on his own.

– Jones does choose A on his own, though, so Black doesn't actually intervene.

– We'd therefore hold Jones responsible for choosing and doing A – even though he had no alternative.

Black

Jones

Suppose A = throw the game by missing that shot

Questions for thought/discussion

- **Applying Frankfurt's case to compatibilism requires a notion of a *global* controller, ruling out *any* alternative possibilities (p. 84) – so that Jones wouldn't have control, e.g., over the desires or values or reasons that led him to choose A.**

- **We could still say that Jones chose A "on his own" and hence was responsible for A, as long as the global controller never actually intervened.**

- **But could there be a Frankfurt-style case that's both global and *impersonal* – without another agent as controller, but rather just laws of nature, as needed for an analogy to causal determinism?**

- **Frankfurt 's own case isn't meant as a case of (global) determinism, but is just supposed to show that ruling out alternative possibilities needn't rule out responsibility or free will.**

Prior signs and interventions

- **One line of objection to Frankfurt's case notes that Black's ability to intervene depends on Jones's providing some prior sign of what he's going to do. So he does have alternative possibilities at that earlier point.**

  - **But if the prior sign is voluntary, we could simply modify the case by shifting Black's hypothetical control back to *that*.**

  - **On the other hand, if the prior sign is *in*voluntary, Jones can't be responsible for it. It's only a "flicker" of freedom, in Fischer's term, not robust enough to support responsibility.**

- **To avoid the need for a prior sign, other authors instead offer "blockage" cases, in which Black does intervene earlier, but only to the extent of setting up a future barrier to alternative choice that doesn't interfere with Jones' actual choice of A, which he still makes for reasons of his own.**

The Indeterministic World Objection

- **Kane stresses another line of objection that's meant to show that Frankfurt-style cases assume determinism and hence beg the question against libertarianism:**

  – **If Jones's choice were undetermined up to the moment when he decides whether or not to do A, Black would by then no longer be able to control his choice, so Jones *would* have alternative possibilities.**

  – **If Black didn't wait, and did something earlier to make Jones choose A then he'd no longer be just a *hypothetical* controller and he, rather than Jones, would be responsible for Jones's doing A.**

- **In response to "blockage" cases – even the Mele/Robb case, where Jones's actual deliberative process is undetermined but would be preempted if he chose an alternative to A – Kane says that blocking all alternatives amounts to determining Jones's choice in advance, so that libertarians wouldn't share the intuition that he's responsible.**

New bases for free will

- **Though Kane thinks Frankfurt-style cases show only that determinists should be compatibilists (i.e. soft determinists), they still change the terms of the free will debate, by undermining**

  - **versions of *compatibilism* based on the hypothetical analysis**

  - **the Consequence Argument for *incompatibilism* (covering both libertarianism and hard incompatibilism)**

- **What makes both of these approaches vulnerable to Frankfurt-style cases is their dependence on taking the ability to do otherwise as a requirement of free will.**

- **In general terms, what the cases apparently tell us is that free will doesn't depend on the Garden of Forking Paths.**

Ch. 9: Frankfurt's positive "hierarchical" account

- **Frankfurt takes classical compatibilism to capture only freedom of action (Kane's "surface" freedom), by ruling out external constraint.**

- **In order to capture freedom of the will, we also need to rule out cases of *internal* constraint: addictions and other compulsive behavior, where we're not in control of our will.**

- **Frankfurt's way of doing so rests on distinguishing between two levels of desire: "second-order" desires are *about* "first-order desires"; when they're about the desires' effectiveness in action, they count as second-order *volitions*.**

  - **This hierarchical structure underlies the capacity for reflective self-evaluation that makes us *persons*.**

  - **If we just act impulsively on our first-order desires without reflection, we're *wantons*; complete wantons (with no second-order desires at all) wouldn't be persons.**

Frankfurt's compatibilism

- On Frankfurt's account, *freedom* involves the capacity to act on our second-order desires in such cases: "having the will (first-order) that one wants (second-order)."

- An unwilling addict would be unfree because he has but can't act on a second-order desire *not* to act on his first-order desire to take the drug.

- Those of us who *can* resist acting on our impulses on the basis of reflective self-evaluation (= forming a second-order desire) count as free, whether or not that capacity is causally determined.

unwilling addict

A problem for Frankfurt

- **What if we're wantons *about* our second-order desires?**

  - Double gives the case of a cult member who never questions his second-order desire to act on his first-order desire to sacrifice his life if the cult leader asks. Intuitively, he seems unfree.

  - But requiring reflection on higher-order desires would lead to an infinite regress.

- **Frankfurt attempts to handle this by introducing alternatives to third-order reflection:**

  - <u>identification</u>: decisive commitment to a second-order desire. But Watson objects to this as arbitrary; we want to know what gives the higher-order desires a special relation to the agent.

  - <u>wholeheartedness</u>: no volitional conflicts (ambivalence). But Watson objects that this may be the result of brainwashing or severe conditioning – behavioral engineering, as in Kane's example of Walden Two.

A further problem?

- **Kane also notes that resolving everyday volitional conflicts (e.g. over what job to take, as in Molly's case, or where to vacation, as in Mike's) is one of the main areas in which we want free will.**

- **But on Frankfurt's account we'd be free only *after* we've resolved such conflicts, since only then are we wholehearted.**

    - **[Frankfurt's requirement of wholeheartedness applies to *second-order* desires, however. Molly or Mike would count as free if they just haven't decided how best to satisfy general desires for the best job or vacation. Kane's objection needs to be reframed to apply to cases of making up our mind about how to evaluate our first-order desires.]**

    - **More generally, all that matters on Frankfurt's account is how we are at the time of action, not how we got there. But it does seem to make a difference whether we resolve a conflict on our own or as a result of brainwashing, behavioral engineering, etc.**

A value-based alternative account

- **Watson instead proposes an account in terms of practical reason or values, as potentially in conflict with our desires or motives.**

    - **When we act on a desire that goes against the reasons we recognize, we exhibit weakness of will (what the Greeks called *akrasia*), which Watson takes as unfree.**

    - **This isn't a question of causal determination but of compulsive choice, on the model of kleptomania, with Desire exerting influence on action independent of Reason.**

    - **On Watson's account free will involves the right relation between our valuational and motivational systems, so that we act in accordance with our values.**

- **His view harks back to Plato's view of self-control as the rule of Reason over Desire.**

Objections to Watson

a kleptomaniac?

- It's not obvious that weak-willed behavior is always compulsive, or unfree. Don't we hold people responsible for ordinary cases of giving in to temptation?

- [If psychological compulsion involves *irresistible* desires. and the normal agent is able to resist, doesn't that mean he satisfies AP?]

- Also, as with Frankfurt, Watson's view is subject to problems about behavioral engineering, etc. What about people who are manipulated into always acting on their values, as in Walden Two?

"The Reason View"

- **Wolf takes Frankfurt's and Watson's views to be "Real Self" or "Deep Self" views insofar as they count us as free when our acts express the self we identify with or think we ought to be.**

- **However, she thinks something further is required for free will: the ability to conform our behavior to the True and the Good, or normative competence.**

  - **Without this, an agent acting from his Real or Deep Self would count as "insane" in the sense of not knowing the difference between right and wrong.**

  - **Wolf's own view, which she dubs "the Reason View," results in "the asymmetry thesis": that blame but not praise would be undermined by causal determination (understood as making the agent unable to do otherwise).**

Objections to Wolf

- **Don't we assume in cases of praise that the agent somehow contributed to the formation of his good character – whereas in cases where we excuse someone from blame on grounds of insanity, we assume he *couldn't help* becoming insane?**

- **Consider Darth the hit man, who might well have *chosen* to become what he is – and in that case would seem to be responsible for what he does. But if, without his knowledge, he were given a drug that made him saintly, he would *not* seem to be responsible – as he would be if he resisted the temptation to revert once the drug wore off.**

Darth the hit man

Ch. 10:
Strawsonian compatibilism

Another group of "new compatibilists," following P. F. Strawson, approaches free will and responsibility in terms of our social practice of *holding* people responsible.

- We hold people responsible by feeling certain "reactive attitudes" such as gratitude or resentment (see list, p. 107) toward others for acts seen as expressing good or ill will.

- A fit subject of reactive attitudes is an agent who isn't excused or exempt from responsibility according to our practice.

- Our practice is justified as an expression of human needs and concerns, not by metaphysical claims about determinism.

- It would be impossible and irrational to modify our practice in light of determinism, exempting everyone from responsibility, since that would mean giving up our concern with others' good or ill will [as needed for genuinely *interpersonal* relationships, vs. treating each other as *objects* rather than persons].

Wallace's version

- **Later "reactive attitude theories" attempt to fill out the rationale behind our practice: what it is that makes someone a fit subject of reactive attitudes.**

- **Wallace appeals to *fairness* as our reason for not holding certain agents responsible. They're responsible as long as they violated an obligation we could reasonably have expected them to obey, but not if**

  - **they didn't c*hoose* to do wrong (in Strawson's terms, they exhibited no ill will) and hence are *excused* from responsibility (as with cases of accident or mistake; cf. John's failure to pick up Molly), or**

  - **they didn't have the power of *reflective self-control*, and hence are *exempt* from responsibility (as with very young children, the retarded, the addicted, and the insane).**

Fairness and PAP

Wallace wants to say that, since determinism doesn't imply either of his two conditions, it's no threat to responsibility. But Kane asks whether it wouldn't also be unfair to blame someone for not doing something he was unable to do – as determinism would say of anything he *didn't* do.

– In other words, Wallace's rationale in terms of fairness does seem to imply PAP, though he rejects that principle on Strawsonian grounds, as irrelevant to our practice of holding people responsible.

– Wallace would respond that our reason for sometimes excusing or exempting agents who have no alternative is that they had no real *obligation* to do otherwise (since "ought" implies "can").

– But Kane counters that, determinism would then rule out obligations to do otherwise, so we could make no distinction between lacking the capacity to do something and simply deciding not to do it – as in the case of an elderly man who doesn't even contact the police about an attack he witnesses but is unable to stop by his own efforts

Another objection

- **Rosen uses the case of Judas's betrayal of Jesus, on the assumption that**

    - Judas does have the general power of reflective self-control that could lead him to be loyal, but

    - God puts laws of nature into force that make it impossible for Judas to *exercise* self-control in the particular circumstances in which he betrays Jesus.

- **The question is whether being "set up" like this wouldn't undermine the justification for blame.**

- **Wallace essentially responds to this (vs. the elderly man case) by distinguishing an agent's inability to do some action from its impossibility on determinist grounds, as in PAP .**

- **But Kane still questions whether the general power of self-control is enough for responsibility, if one can't exercise it in the circumstances.**

Fischer's "semi-compatibilism"

- **Fischer proposes a "reactive attitudes" theory of responsibility based on Frankfurt-style examples rather than a Strawsonian appeal to social practice.**

- **But Fischer holds that**

  - **freedom [in the libertarian sense] requires regulative control, which involves alternative possibilities, whereas**

  - **responsibility [and the related sense of freedom] requires only guidance control, explained in terms of *reasons-responsiveness*: the ability to guide one's behavior by reasons.**

- **Determinism would rule out only regulative control.**

- **This gives us a basis for a hybrid view called "semi-compatibilism," according to which *responsibility* is compatible with determinism, but libertarian *free will* is not. [But Fischer himself thinks the latter notion is irrelevant.]**

Illustrating reasons-responsiveness

- Fischer gives the Frankfurt-style example of Mary, whose steering wheel is locked so that she has to turn left.

- However, she *chooses* to turn left for independent reasons: in order to get to the mall.

- If the steering wheel weren't locked and she recognized different reasons (e.g. if she'd thought the mall was on the right), she would have turned right, so she's *reasons-responsive* – unlike compulsives, addicts, neurotics, etc.

- She's therefore *responsible* (if, e.g., she hits a pedestrian), even though in fact she couldn't have done otherwise.

Mary

"Taking" responsibility

However, the case of predestined Judas and other examples of behavioral engineering such as Walden Two would also seem to involve responsibility on Fischer's account.

- Ultimately, the only way even a semi-compatibilist can exclude such cases is by appeal to a distinction between control by other agents (including God) and determination by impersonal causes. But what's the rationale for that distinction?

- Fischer instead suggests that responsibility involves "*taking* responsibility," viewing oneself as a fair target of reactive attitudes.

- But couldn't the inhabitants of Walden Two be behaviorally engineered to do that, as well? Would that make them any more responsible?

New compatibilist alternatives

New Compatiblism
no hypothetical analysis
free will = responsibility

Frankfurtian
examples refuting PAP
role of reflection (reason)

Strawsonian
social practices
reactive attitudes

Frankfurt
second-order volitions
wholeheartedness

Watson
value/desire hierarchy

Wolf
normative competence
asymmetrical freedom

Strawson
excuses/exemptions
good vs. ill will

Wallace
choice to do wrong
reflective self-control

Fischer
AP for libertarian free will
reasons-responsiveness (Frankfurtian)
taking responsibility (Strawsonian)

Kane's Libertarianism

Ch. 11:
Ultimate Responsibility (UR)

- **Kane reminds us of the two main things we want that incline us toward libertarianism (p. 120; cf. p. 6):**

    1. **alternative possibilities (AP):** to be able to do otherwise than we in fact do

    2. **ultimate responsibility (UR):** that the sources of our actions are in us, not something else

- **AP was stressed by earlier arguments for libertarianism, but Kane now shifts to UR for his answer to the Ascent Problem (getting up Incompatibilist Mountain).**

    - **ultimate responsibility for an action requires being responsible for anything that's a sufficient reason, cause, or motive for it.**

    - **So UR requires that, if an act results from our character, we must have made some past choices that helped to form our character but had no sufficient causes.**

Extending UR to the will

UR has to apply to *some* acts in an agent's history to avoid a regress of causes (as in G. Strawson's "Basic Argument"), and the same also applies to the agent's *motives*, or will.

– **AP wouldn't be enough for free will, as shown by *"Austin-style" examples*, involving a failure to act (e.g. missing a putt, or the target of an assassination attempt) because of a chance event (e.g. a nervous twitch). Even if we assume the event is undetermined, it's outside the agent's voluntary control.**

– **We can also imagine an indeterministic "K-world," in which God lets chance play a significant role (so that we can *do* otherwise) but pre-sets all our reasons, motives, and purposes (so that we can't *will* otherwise).**

– **Consider Kane's Austin-style example of an assassin set to kill the prime minister. His will is set before he acts, but he might miss and kill the aide, so his act is undetermined. If he does succeed in killing the prime minister, he's responsible only if he was responsible for setting his will.**

The "dual regress" of free will

- We thus have two separate but related regresses, according to Kane:

  - of *responsibility for action* (via voluntary acts as causes of character)

  - of *responsibility for motive* (via voluntary acts of setting the will = making up one's mind what to do)

- The first regress has to be stopped by assuming that some of the voluntary acts in the causal chain rendering the agent responsible are undetermined. This is enough to establish incompatibilism on p. 123.

- But stopping the second regress, as needed to attribute free will to an agent, also requires the assumption that there's a point in the causal chain where the agent makes up his mind to act, without sufficient prior motives.

Kane's chain of inferences

- **Kane reviews his argument from free will to AP on p. 129:**

    1. *Free will* entails

    2. *ultimate responsibility* (UR) for our wills as well as our actions, which entails

    3. *will-setting actions* at some points in our lives, which in turn entail that some of our actions must satisfy

    4. *the plurality conditions,* i.e. the agents could have done otherwise voluntarily, intentionally, and rationally, which in turn entails

    5. the agents *could have done otherwise*, or had **alternative possibilities (AP)**.

Self-forming acts (SFA's)

- **What stops a regress of acts of setting the will is what Kane calls a "will-setting" act, where the will is set only *in* taking action.**

- **The agent at some point just makes a choice among competing options, though she has no decisive reason for choosing the particular one she does.**

- **Since undetermined will-setting acts contribute to the formation of our characters, Kane refers to them as "self-forming acts" (SFA's).**

  - **UR requires that *some* of our acts be SFA's.**

  - **But not all free acts are SFA's; most are consequences of earlier SFA's (cf. character cases discussed earlier , e.g. Luther).**

Ch. 12:
Scientific Bases

- **Having ascended "Incompatibilist Mountain," Kane now has to descend — by making sense of responsibility for acts without sufficient causes or motives.**

- **His aim is to do without that mysterious "extra factor" that earlier libertarians appealed to and reconcile libertarian free will with modern science.**

- **At the outset he combines two elements of contemporary physics to allow for undetermined events in the brain:**

  - **quantum indeterminism: determinism fails on the micro-level**

  - **chaos/complexity theory: large-scale effects can result from very small changes (e.g., undetermined neuron-firings in the brain can emerge from quantum indeterminacy)**

- **He'll later add something from neuroscience: parallel processing in the brain.**

Escaping the Libertarian Dilemma

- **To answer the charge that indeterminism would take action out of the agent's control, Kane focuses on *conflict*.**

- **When we're torn between competing visions of what we should do or become, one might imagine that chaos is stirred up in the brain, making it sensitive to micro-indeterminacies.**

- **Our choice can still be rational and voluntary, however, since we have reasons and motives either way, and we decide which prevail.**

  - **What we're doing is analogous to blocking out indeterministic "noise" when concentrating on achieving a specific aim like solving a math problem. If we overcome this obstacle and succeed in achieving the aim, we're responsible.**

  - **This is illustrated for non-SFA's by Austin-style cases (assuming we do make the putt, etc.) and by Kane's case of an enraged husband intentionally breaking a glass table (where actual breakage depends on undetermined physical factors).**

"Doubling"

- **Cases of conflict essentially involve "doubling" the indeterministic noise, so that it also pertains to the agent's will.**

- **Consider a businesswoman who has to choose between getting to an important meeting and aiding an assault victim.**

  - **Whichever SFA she chooses, she'll be overcoming one desire and making the other prevail.**

  - **So she'll be succeeding in doing something she was trying to do, for a case of plural voluntary control.**

Indeterminism as an interfering factor

- **This seems to be Kane's basic picture (but "doubled"):**

[Indeterminism]

agent's effort → **action**

- **If the act comes from an effort that the agent endorses as his own, then Kane thinks that puts it under the agent's control, even though the degree of control is lessened by the interference of indeterminism (see p. 143).**

- **[But isn't indeterminism really just the failure of thoroughgoing determinism, rather than some sort of countervailing force? Is Kane treating it as an "extra factor," even if not metaphysical?]**

Parallel processing and endorsement

- **To allow for simultaneously trying to satisfy two conflicting desires, Kane turns to neuroscience for another recent scientific discovery: parallel processing in the brain, whereby we work on two cognitive tasks at once, e.g. color and shape in vision.**

- **Note, though, that Kane's several references toward the end of ch. 12 to an agent's endorsement of his/her act or its outcome spell out his underlying reason for assigning responsibility in such cases.**

- **It's the fact that the successful Austin-style assassin endorses what he's doing that's said to make him responsible if his attempt succeeds, and Kane also uses endorsement to explain the responsibility of the businesswoman.**

Questions for thought/discussion

- **If it depends on "endorsement," doesn't Kane's answer to the Descent Problem fall subject to some of the same objections he raised against competing views in his earlier argument?**

- **For instance, even if an agent's choice is undetermined, couldn't he be *behaviorally engineered* in the manner of Walden Two into endorsing it as his own, when it's really just a result of chance factors?**

    – **[In more ordinary terms: might endorsement of acts over which we really had no control result from a tendency to "rationalize" what we do – as in cases of post-hypnotic suggestion, where the hypnotic subject apparently will "confabulate" reasons to make sense of what he's induced to do.**

    – **After acting on a post-hypnotic suggestion to open a window, e.g., a subject who's asked why he did that will say that he felt cold. Maybe we automatically endorse what we do when there's no other explanation readily available.]**

Rebuffing some "randomness" objections

Kane considers a number of standard objections to libertarianism, presented in roughly ascending order of significance. The first four are said to rest on errors or overstatements:

1. *inferring chance from indeterminism .* (But indeterminism is consistent with other forms of causation, e.g. probabilistic.)

2. *separating the act of will from the undetermined event.* (But what's undetermined *is* the agent's effort)

3. *taking an element of dependence on luck as ruling out responsibility.* (But where achieving a certain outcome depends partly on luck, it's still the agent's doing if he intended and later endorsed it)

4. *taking indeterminism as undermining attribution of choice or control to the agent.* (But it doesn't do so completely, if the undetermined choice is embedded in a "self-defining motivational system" realized in her brain)

Embracing others

- **In response to the fourth objection above, Kane does allow that indeterminism *diminishes* the agent's control.**

- **He goes on to give two further objections, to which he responds in a similar way, by embracing the charge they lodge against him:**

5. *that we're not aware of making two competing efforts in SFA's.* **(But conscious awareness isn't required.)**

6. *that undetermined choices would be arbitrary*. **(But while agents can't have sufficient or conclusive prior reasons for an undetermined choice, they can still have *good* reasons. Etymologically, "arbitrary" just implies that an exercise of judgment is needed to decide among them.)**

A simpler approach?

- **Kane's answers to the Libertarian Dilemma seem to be independent of his particular speculative account in terms of quantum indeterminism, chaos theory, and parallel processing.**

- **He also mentions complexity theory, or the theory of self-organizing systems, but he never spells out how it might be relevant.**

- **However, in answer to objection 4 he refers to the embedding of an undetermined choice in a self-defining motivational system (of purposes, intentions, etc.) in the brain.**

- **If the self-defining system is self-organizing too, perhaps complexity theory might support a naturalistic view of agents as systems of brain events that can influence the activities of their simpler components (individual neuron-firings) without *either* deterministic causation or a basis in quantum indeterminacy.**

Contemporary libertarian alternatives

contemporary libertarianism
explanation by reasons
vs. mysterious extra-factor

Ginet
simple indeterminism
reasons vs. causes
explanation via intentions

O'Connor
bring in agent-causation to
explain origin of intention,
structure of action

Clarke
bring in agent-causation to
explain action not
determined by reasons

Kane
Ultimate Responsibility (UR)
will-setting acts and SFA's where
no sufficient reason

Ch. 14:
Wrap-up

Let's pull things together by listing the five kinds of freedom Kane distinguishes in ch. 14: the first three accommodate a compatibilist view, whereas the last two require libertarianism. Each builds on those preceding.

1. **freedom of self-realization:** ability to do what you want (classical compatibilists Hobbes, Hume, etc.)

2. **freedom of (reflective) self-control:** ability to reflect on your reasons and to guide your behavior in light of them (new compatibilists Frankfurt and Watson, Wallace and Fischer)

3. **freedom of self-perfection:** ability to appreciate the *right* reasons and to guide your behavior in light of them (Wolf)

4. **freedom of self-determination:** ability to act from a will you were ultimately responsible for forming (Kane's UR).

5. **freedom of self-formation:** ability to form your will in a way that's undetermined by the past (Kane's SFA's).

Review

Let's review by considering each of Kane's five types of freedom in turn.

See if you can supply the main objections to each of them – either those Kane points out (in earlier chapters, if not here) or others you'd like to add.

1. Freedom of self-realization

Ability to do what you want

classical compatibilists Hobbes, Hume, etc.

2. Freedom of (reflective) self-control

Ability to reflect on your reasons and to guide your behavior in light of them

new compatibilists Frankfurt and Watson, Wallace and Fischer

3. Freedom of self-perfection

Ability to appreciate the _right_ reasons and to guide your behavior in light of them

Wolf

4. Freedom of self-determination

Ability to act from a will you were ultimately responsible for forming

Kane's UR

5. Freedom of self-formation

Ability to form your will in a way that's undetermined by the past

Kane's will-setting SFA's