



TRUST AS AN AFFECTIVE ATTITUDE

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Introduction

- “[T]rust is an attitude of optimism that the goodwill and competence of another will extend to cover the domain of our interaction with [them], together with the expectation that the one trusted will be directly and favorably moved by the thought that we are counting on [them]” (Pg. 4).
- We use trust in many ways.
 - Jones is concerned with interpersonal trust.
 - Friendship
 - Professionals/clients
 - Strangers (sometimes)
 - The people/governments (sometimes)

The Attitude of Optimism

- “[T]rust is an attitude of optimism that the goodwill and competence of another will extend to cover the domain of our interaction with [them].”
 - Attitude of optimism: A distinctive and affectively loaded way of seeing the trusted.
 - This way of seeing explains why we let the trusted get near things we care about.
- Optimism: Anticipation that another will have/display goodwill (*and* competence).
 - Qualified domain.
 - Optimism doesn’t extend far to strangers.
 - Expect technical competence from professionals.
 - Expect moral competence from friends.

The Attitude of Optimism

- Emotions:

- Are “partly constituted by patterns of salience and tendencies of interpretation” (Pg. 11).
- Suggest a particular line of inquiry.
- Get us to focus on a partial field of evidence.
- Give rise to beliefs.
- Are distinctive ways of seeing a situation.

The Attitude of Optimism

- Attitude of Optimism is constituted by a distinctive trusting cognitive set.
 - This cognitive set restricts interpretations of behavior/motives.
 - So, trust limits our interpretation of the words/actions of another.

The Second Half

- “...the one trusted will be directly and favorably moved by the thought that we are counting on [them].”
 - If the trusted is merely indirectly moved, this is not trust.
 - Directly: Trust vs. reliance.
 - Favorably: More likely to do what they’re being trusted with.

Distrust

- Distrust = Wary suspicion.
- Pessimism as opposed to optimism.
- Suggests the affective attitude interpretation of trust.
 - Self-confidence involves affective attitude.
 - Be self-confident = “Trust yourself”
 - Confidence is about capacity
 - Trust is about goodwill

An Account of Trust

- Trust has two elements:
 - Cognitive
 - Affective/Emotional
- Trusting Relationship: A has an optimistic attitude toward B about B's goodwill and expects that B will be moved by the thought that A's counting on them.
 - This attitude and expectation explain why we rely on the trusted.
- There can be moments of trust in other relationships.

An Account of Trust

- Affective element + Expectation
 - Truster expects the trusted to be directly and favorably moved.
 - The trusted's awareness of the expectation is a motivation to be trustworthy.
 - Trustworthy: Give significant weight to the fact that someone is counting on you.
 - Not an expectation of actual performance.
- Trusting is associated with discretionary powers.

An Account of Trust

- Affective element + Expectation
 - Consider unwelcome trust.
 - We don't want to be counted on.
 - Is this always unwelcome entrusting?
 - No. Trust can still be burdensome if nothing is entrusted.
 - Consider reliable benevolence.
 - If someone is only concerned with your well-being, they will do things without your counting on them.
 - Attitude of optimism without seeing one as trustworthy.

Physician Case

- Why must there be an expectation that the physician will be moved by the thought of a patient counting on them?
 - Patient expectations should shape the physician's understanding of good practice.
 - This is why physicians can have reservations about certain patients.

Phobic Emotions

- Does trust have parallels to phobic emotions?
 - Implausible to have phobic trusting.
 - Trusting someone briefly vs. a trusting relationship.
 - Trusting can be momentary.
 - When we say “A trusts B” it usually refers to a trusting relationship.
 - A trusting relationship requires a consistent pattern of interpreting/seeing someone through the lens of trust.
 - Generally not aware of our trusting.

Trust vs. Reliance

- Baier: Trust is not a precondition for relying on someone.
- You can rely on computers and machines, but not trust them.
 - One can only trust what has a will.
 - A will is necessary for goodwill.
- We rely only when predicting a favorable outcome.
- We trust even when we wouldn't be justified in predicting a favorable outcome.
 - Hoping rather than predicting.

Account Advantages

- An account of trust must explain (Pg. 15):
 - 1. That trust and distrust are contraries but not contradictories.
 - 2. That trust cannot be willed.
 - 3. That trust can give rise to beliefs that are abnormally resistant to evidence.
- Placing an affective attitude at the center of trust explains all three.

Account Advantages

- Trust and distrust involve attitudes.
- Optimism and pessimism are not contradictories.
- Lack of trust \neq Distrust.
- Trust cannot be adopted at will.
- Trust leads to beliefs that are resistant to evidence.
 - Self-confirming.

Baier's Account

- “[T]rusting is a matter of entrusting” (Pg. 17).
 - A trusts B with valued thing C.
- Three difficulties:
 - Regimented. May be difficult to specify exactly what is entrusted.
 - Suggests a greater degree of consciousness/explicitness than our trusting relations display.
 - Overlooks plain, non-goods-relativized, trust.

Baier's Account

- Jones tests Baier's account. Does it explain:
 - 1. That trust and distrust are contraries but not contradictories?
 - No. Not entrusting = Distrusting.
 - 2. That trust cannot be willed?
 - No. Entrusting can be willed.
 - 3. That trust can give rise to beliefs that are abnormally resistant to evidence?
 - Entrusting model is silent here.

Justified Trusting

- What should our rational default position be?
 - Trusting cognitive set
 - Distrust
 - Neutrality
- Are there motives to distrust? Check:
 - Social climate
 - Domain
 - Signals likelihood of performance.
 - Consequences
 - Interact with domain to justify a default stance.
 - It is “important...how [domain and consequences] interact to determine the expected disutility of misplaced trust” (Pg. 21).

Justified Trusting

- One may have reason to distrust their tendencies toward trust/distrust.
 - Poor affective instruments.
 - Mistaking mannerisms of privilege for trustworthiness.

Trusting Before Evidence

- Examples of trusting before gathering evidence (Pg. 22):
 - 1. “[W]hen trust is governed by forward-looking or instrumental considerations.”
 - 2. “[W]hen trust is governed by backward-looking considerations of evidence but our responses seem to outstrip the evidence.”

Trusting Before Evidence

- Forward-looking cases:
 - Trust isn't willed, but cultivated.
 - We can will to pay attention to that which creates trust.
 - Control patterns of attention, lines of inquiry, and interpretation.
 - We trust...to elicit trustworthy behavior.
 - This could be an act.
 - “Trust acting” only brings about imperceptible differences in outcomes with those you are familiar with.
 - But if you're familiar, you shouldn't have to act.
 - If fantasy is required, the potential for trustworthiness is low.

Trusting Before Evidence

- Backward-looking cases:
 - Flash intuitive assessments not based on evidence.
 - Greenspan example (Pg. 24):
 - One is suspicious of a salesman, despite a friend's recommendation.
 - One cannot pinpoint why they are suspicious.
 - See him as untrustworthy, despite belief that he is trustworthy.
 - Possible justified belief requirements:
 - The ability to offer an account of what justifies the belief.
 - Having a belief that tracks the truth across some range of counterfactual circumstances.
 - Having a belief formed by a reliable process and the absence of undermining beliefs.

Trusting Before Evidence

- But in practice, it seems we should give weight to our suspicions.
- “[E]ven though we've decisively shown the belief that the other is untrustworthy is unjustified, we haven't decisively shown that distrust is unjustified” (Pg. 24).
- If cases of forward- and backward-looking considerations of evidence exist then:
 - “[A]n account of trust that makes affect central has an unexpected payoff.” (Pg. 25).
 - “[S]uch cases can be justified without confronting the evidentialist thesis.” (Pg. 25).