"The anti-abortionist charges, not unreasonably, that pro-choice principles concerning killing are too narrow to be acceptable; the pro-choicer charges, not unreasonably, that anti-abortionist principles concerning killing are too broad to be acceptable." (185)
"If it is legitimate for the pro-choicer to demand that the anti-abortionist provide an explanation of the connection between the biological character of being a human being and the wrongness of being killed . . . then it is legitimate for the anti-abortionist to demand that the pro-choicer provide an explanation of the connection between psychological criteria for being a person and the wrongness of being killed . . ." (187)
The crucial moral category in Marquis' argument is not that of a person or a potential person. It is rather the category of "having a valuable future like ours" (192).
In order to establish the conclusion that the vast majority of abortions are wrong, Marquis does not need to show that a necessary condition of the wrongness of killing some being is that it deprive it of the value of a future like ours. He needs merely to show that a sufficient condition of the wrongness of killing some being is that it deprive it of this value. (194-195)
A necessary condition for the wrongness of killing a being is that doing so interfere with the fulfillment of the being's desire to go on living. But fetuses don't have a desire to go on living. So killing them is not wrong. (195-196)
Only victims can be wronged. A victim must have sentience. But embryos don't have sentience. An embryo is thus not a victim and can't be wronged. So it does not wrong an embryo to have an abortion. (199)
Contrary to what Marquis contends, it's not the case that depriving a being of the value of a future like ours is wrong. For if Marquis' contention were true, then contraception would be wrong. And that's absurd. (201)
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