PHIL482 Philosophy of
Psychology: Subjectivity (3 credits).
Prerequisite: six credit hours in philosophy; one of which must be PHIL280
or PHIL366.
TuTh: 12.30-1.45 pm, Skinner 1112.
Instructor: Peter Carruthers. pcarruth@umd.edu Office hours: TuTh 2-3.
1. Course description
Consciousness has been described as a final frontier for science, comparable to the problem of the origin of the universe; and explaining consciousness has been called the hard problem. Some people deny that consciousness can be explained; and some claim that consciousness shows the inadequacy of functionalist and/or physicalist accounts of the mental. Others have attempted to explain consciousness in natural terms, but there are heated disputes about the kind of explanation that is needed. This course will examine a range of recent approaches to consciousness, looking first at skeptics about its explicability, and then focusing especially on attempts to provide a naturalistic theory. The aim of the course is to introduce students to these debates, and to encourage them to engage with those debates in a sophisticated and knowledgeable way.
All of the texts to be used in the course are accessible on-line at:
This is an immense resource, containing almost a thousand papers on the philosophy of consciousness (as well as many on the science of consciousness). Some judicious additional reading within it should be done when preparing the term paper and final exam essays.
The course will follow the tentative schedule outlined in #3 below. The reading associated with each session should be studied in advance. The instructor will present some of the highlights, and will explain some of the more difficult ideas, but a significant proportion of each session will be devoted to class discussion. To be effective, this requires advance reading.
2. Course requirements
Grades for the course will be based upon one term-paper and the final exam. The term paper will be worth 50% of the grade, and each of the two final exam essays will be worth 25% of the grade. The term paper will be written on one of the topics discussed in the first half of the course (prior to Spring Break). The exam essays will be written on topics discussed in the second half of the course (after Spring Break).
The term paper is due on Friday April 6. Papers should be submitted electronically as a Word or WordPerfect attachment to the instructors umd email address. Term papers should be between 4,000 and 6,000 words in length. Under-length papers will be penalized. The instructor will cease reading over-length papers at the point where he judges that they exceed the word limit. For term paper topics, see #4 below. Unexcused lateness will be penalized at a rate of one third of a grade per calendar day. (Weak excuses will not be accepted, and in any case excuses need to be presented in advance.)
All students will need to prepare a detailed one-page (single spaced) abstract of their intended paper. This will be presented to the instructor for discussion and feedback in a one-on-one meeting during the week of March 12 (before Spring Break) or March 26 (after Spring Break). A schedule of meeting times will be circulated in class and then posted on the instructors door (Skinner 1125). Students who fail to present an abstract during the above weeks will have their grade for the term paper reduced by one full grade letter (e.g. from A- to B-).
The final exam will be pre-released in the final regular class of term (Thursday May 10). It will consist of half a dozen or more essay questions, from which students will need to select two. The two essays should be prepared in detail in advance, and then written out into two separate exam books during the final two-hour exam. You may not, however, bring any papers or books into the exam. Exam answers will be graded anonymously (by folding back the cover sheet and shuffling), so do not write your name within the exam booklet itself.
3. Schedule of topics and readings
To access the required reading for a given session, click on the appropriate link. Note: changes might be made to this schedule and/or the required readings as the course progresses. If so, an email notification will be sent out.
Session 1 (1/25): background: the case for physicalism
Peter Carruthers, The nature of the mind, chapter 5 (read only the first two sections)
Session 2 (1/30): continuing with physicalism, then blindsight
Lawrence Weiskrantz, Blindsight reconsidered
Session 3 (2/1): two visual systems
David Milner and Melvyn Goodale, The visual brain in action (precis)
Session 4 (2/6): global broadcasting
Bernard Baars, In the theatre of consciousness
Session 5 (2/8): creature-consciousness, state-consciousness, access-consciousness, phenomenal-consciousness, and more
David Rosenthal, State consciousness and transitive consciousness (read only the first two sections)
Session 6 (2/13): kinds of consciousness continued
Ned Block, On a confusion about a function of consciousness
Session 7 (2/15): the knowledge argument
Thomas Nagel, What is it like to be a bat?
Frank Jackson, Epiphenomenal qualia (with excerpts from What Mary didnt know)
Session 8 (2/20): responses to the knowledge argument
Michael Tye, Knowing what it is like: The ability hypothesis and the knowledge argument
Session 9 (2/22): on zombies
David Chalmers, Self-ascription without qualia: A case-study (on zombies)
Daniel Dennett, The zombic hunch: Extinction of an intuition?
Session 10 (2/27): the explanatory gap
David Chalmers, Facing up to the problem of consciousness
Session 11 (3/1): consciousness: physical but irredeemably mysterious?
Colin McGinn, Consciousness and Space
Session 12 (3/6): the gap as illusion
Michael Tye, Phenomenal consciousness: The explanatory gap as cognitive illusion
Session 13 (3/8): explaining the explanatory gap
Peter Carruthers and Benedicte Veillet, The Phenomenal Concept Strategy
Session 14 (3/13): does conceivability entail possibility? is dualism the only option?
David Chalmers, Consciousness and its place in nature (in support of dualism)
One-one meetings with the instructor to
discuss an abstract take place during
this week.
Session 15 (3/15): reply to Chalmers
Christopher Hill, Modality, Modal epistemology, and the metaphysics of consciousness (read the first 12 pages, sections I and II)
[ Stephen Yablo, Consciousness and Concepts ]
Spring
Break
Session 16 (3/27): Representational theories of consciousness
William Lycan, Representational theories of consciousness
One-one meetings with the instructor to
discuss an abstract take place during this week.
Session 17 (3/29): First-order representationalism: Dretske
Fred Dretske, Experience as representation
Session 18 (4/3): First-order representationalism: Tye
Michael Tye, Representationalist theories of consciousness
Session 19 (4/5): non-conceptual content (discussion will be led by Vincent Picciuto)
Michael Tye, Nonconceptual content, richness, and fineness of grain
Term papers are due on 4/6
Session 20 (4/10): Inner sense theory: Lycan
William Lycan, Consciousness as internal monitoring
Session 21 (4/12): Higher-order thought theory: Rosenthal
David Rosenthal, State consciousness and what its like
Session 22 (4/17): Dispositional higher-order thought theory: Carruthers
Carruthers, Phenomenal Consciousness, chapter 9
Session 23 (4/19): Same-state monitoring theory: Kriegel
Uriah Kriegel, The same-order monitoring theory of consciousness
Session 24 (4/24): Dual-content theory: Carruthers
Carruthers, Dual-content theory: the explanatory advantages
Session 25 (4/26): Multiple drafts theory: Dennett
Daniel Dennett & Marcel Kinsbourne, Time and the observer: The where and when of consciousness in the brain
Session 26 (5/1): Multiple drafts continued: time and the observer
Daniel Dennett & Marcel Kinsbourne, Time and the observer: The where and when of consciousness in the brain
Session 27 (5/3): animal consciousness and sympathy
Carruthers, Suffering without subjectivity
Session 28 (5/8): animal consciousness and comparative psychology
Carruthers, Why the questions of animal consciousness doesnt matter very much
Session 29 (5/10): issuing of exam questions and review
Final exam: Thursday May 17, 1.30-3.30 pm.
4. Term
paper topics
Write your term paper on one of the topics listed below. Be sure to include only what is necessary to answer the question: irrelevance will be penalized. However, your answer should begin by laying out the different kinds of consciousness, making clear which kinds are under discussion thereafter.
1. Explain and evaluate the knowledge argument. Explain how you think that argument should best be responded to.
2. Is there an explanatory gap between all physical, functional, and intentional facts and the facts of phenomenal consciousness? Is the gap a genuine one, or somehow illusory?
3. Are zombies really conceivable? What (if anything) would follow for the metaphysics of consciousness if they are?
For general advice on writing philosophy papers (and exam answers) go to the Departments undergraduate resources page:
http://www.philosophy.umd.edu/deptwebsite/undergraduateprogram/resources-undergrad.html
You should be scrupulous in avoiding plagiarism and other forms of academic dishonesty. For the campus code of academic integrity, see the following page:
http://www.shc.umd.edu/code.html
Grades will be assigned in accordance with the following criteria. There are eight broad dimensions of assessment:
For purposes of averaging and calculating final grades, the following conversion will be used:
Missing work will be assigned zero. Note that this will have a very significant effect on your overall average grade.
You should note that
undergraduate grades issued at the
This normal distribution will be borne in mind when assigning the grades for this course.
If you have a disability of any sort that requires some accommodation to be made in the arrangements for the course, you should inform the Instructor at the start of the course, who will then consult with the Universitys Disability Support Service.
It is your responsibility to inform the Instructor of any intended absences for religious observances in advance.
Enjoy
!