Articles on animals
 Are epistemic emotions metacognitive? Philosophical Psychology (2017).
 The evolution of self-knowledge. (With Logan Fletcher and Brendan Ritchie.) Philosophical Topics, 40 (2012), 13-37. (Published in 2014.)
 The evolution of working memory. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 110 (2013), 10371-10378.
 Animal minds are real, (distinctively) human minds are not. American Philosophical Quarterly 50 (2013), 233-247.
 Behavior-reading versus mentalizing in animals. (With Logan Fletcher.) In J. Metcalfe and H. Terrace (eds.), Agency and Joint Attention. OUP, 2013.
 The emergence of metacognition: affect and uncertainty in animals. (With Brendan Ritchie.) In M.Beran, J.Brandl, J.Perner, and J.Proust (eds.), Foundations of Metacognition. OUP, 2012.
 Animal mentality: its character, extent, and moral significance. In R. Frey and T. Beauchamp (eds.), Handbook on Ethics and Animals. OUP, 2011.
 Against the moral standing of animals. In C. Morris (ed.), Practical Ethics: questions of life and death. OUP, 2011.
 Invertebrate concepts confront the Generality Constraint (and win). In R. Lurz (ed.), The Philosophy of Animal Minds. CUP, 2009.
 Meta-cognition in animals: a skeptical look. Mind and Language, 23 (2008), 58-89.
 Invertebrate minds: a challenge for ethical theory. Journal of Ethics, 11 (2007), 275-297. Click here for pdf.
 Why the question of animal consciousness might not matter very much. Philosophical Psychology, 17 (2004), 83-102. Click here for pdf.
 Replies to critics: explaining subjectivity. Psyche, 6 (2000). (Replying to ten refereed articles in the same journal targeted on .)
 Animal subjectivity. Psyche 4 (1998). (Long abstract and reworking of phenomenal consciousness article #, to provide a target paper for a special issue of the journal devoted to animal consciousness.)
 Brute experience. The Journal of Philosophy, 86 (1989), 63-79.