All
(most) articles, arranged chronologically
[112] The contents and causes of curiosity. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, (2024). [accepted in 2021]
[111] On valence: imperative or representation of value? British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 74 (2023), 533-553. [accepted in 2020]
[110] Pretend play: more imitative than imaginative. (With Heather Adair.) Mind & Language 38 (2023), 464-479.
[109] Model-free metacognition. (With David Williams.) Cognition, 225 (2022), 105117.
[108] Responsibility and consciousness. (With Matt King.) In D. Nelkin & D. Pereboom (eds.), Handbook of Moral Responsibility. Oxford University Press (2022), 448-467.
[107] Explicit nonconceptual metacognition. Philosophical Studies, 178 (2021), 2337-2356.
[106] Linking metacognition and mindreading: Evidence from autism and dual-task investigations. (With David Williams, Toby Nicholson, Catherine Grainger, and Sophie Lind.) Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 150 (2021), 206-220.
[105] Stop caring about consciousness. Philosophical Topics, 48 (2020), 1-20.
[104] Representing the mind as such in infancy. Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 11 (2020), 765-780.
[103] How mindreading might mislead cognitive science. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 27, 7-8 (2020), 195-219.
[102] Questions in development. In L. Butler, S. Ronfard, & K. Corriveau (eds.), The Questioning Child: Insights from psychology and education. CUP (2020), 6-28.
[101] Mechanisms for constrained stochasticity. Synthese, 197 (2020), 4455-4473.
[100] Comparative metacognition. (With David Williams.) Animal Behavior and Cognition, 6 (2019), 278-288.
[99] Cognitive instincts versus cognitive gadgets: A fallacy. (With Aida Roige.) Mind & Language, 34 (2019), 540-550.
[98] Relationships between implicit and explicit uncertainty monitoring and mindreading: Evidence from autism spectrum disorder. (With Toby Nicholson, David Williams, Catherine Grainger, and Sophie Lind.) Consciousness and Cognition, 70 (2019), 11-24.
[97] Young children flexibly attribute mental states to others. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences (2018), 115, 11351-11353.
[96] The problem of animal consciousness. Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association, 92 (2018), 179-205.
[95] Comparative psychology without consciousness. Consciousness and Cognition, 63 (2018), 47-60.
[94] The causes and contents of inner speech. In P. Langland-Hassan & A.Vicente (eds.), Inner Speech: new voices. Oxford University Press (2018), 31-52.
[93] Can you spot a liar? Deception, mindreading, and the case of autism spectrum disorder. (With David Williams, Toby Nicholson, Catherine Grainger, and Sophie Lind.) Autism Research, (2018), 11, 1129-1137.
[92] Basic questions. Mind & Language, 33 (2018), 130-147.
[91] Valence and Value. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 97 (2018), 658-80.
[90] Implicit versus explicit attitudes: Differing manifestations of the same representational structures? Review of Philosophy and Psychology 9 (2018), 51-72.
[89] Consciousness operationalized, a debate realigned. (With Bénédicte Veillet.) Consciousness and Cognition, 55 (2017), 79-90.
[88] The illusion of conscious thought. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 24, 9-10 (2017), 228-252.
[87] Are epistemic emotions metacognitive? Philosophical Psychology, 30 (2017), 58-78.
[86] In defense of first-order representationalism. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 24, 5-6 (2017), 74-87.
[85] Pragmatic development explains the Theory-of-Mind Scale. (With Evan Westra.) Cognition, 158 (2017), 165-176.
[84] Block’s overflow argument. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 97 (2017).
[83] Mindreading in adults: evaluating two-systems views. Synthese, 194 (2017), 673-688.
[82] Opening up vision: The case against encapsulation. (With Ryan Ogilvie.) Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 7 (2016), 721-742.
[81] Imagination
and pretense. (With Elizabeth Picciuto.) In A.
Kind (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Imagination. Routledge,
2016.
[80] Two systems for mindreading? Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 7 (2016), 141-162.
[79] Perceiving mental states. Consciousness and Cognition 36 (2015), 498-507.ÂÂ
[78] On central cognition. Philosophical Studies, 170 (2014), 143-162.
[77] The fragmentation of reasoning.
In P. Quintanilla, C. Mantilla, and P. Cépeda
(eds.), Cognición Social y Lenguaje: La intersubjetividad en la
evolución de la especie y en
el desarrollo del nińo,
Lima: Fondo Editorial de la Pontificia Universidad
Católica del Perú, 2014.
[76] The evolution of self-knowledge. (With Logan Fletcher and Brendan Ritchie.) Philosophical Topics, 40 (2012), 13-37. (Published in 2014.)
[75] The evolution of working memory. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 110 (2013), 10371-10378.
[74] Animal minds are real, (distinctively) human minds are not. American Philosophical Quarterly 50 (2013), 233-247.
[73] Mindreading in infancy. Mind & Language, 28 (2013), 141-172.
[72] Mindreading the self. In S. Baron-Cohen, H. Tager-Flusberg, and M. Lombardo (eds.), Understanding Other Minds, Third Edition. OUP, 2013.
[71] Behavior-reading versus mentalizing in animals. (With Logan Fletcher.) In J. Metcalfe and H. Terrace (eds.), Agency and Joint Attention. OUP, 2013.
[70] On knowing your own beliefs. In N. Nottelmann (ed.), New Essays on Belief: Structure, Constitution and Content. Palgrave MacMillan, 2013.
[69] The bodily senses. (With Brendan Ritchie.) In M. Matthen (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Perception. Oxford University Press, 2013.
[68] Inner sense. (With Vincent Picciuto.) In M. Matthen, M. Biggs, and J. Stokes (eds.), Perception and its Modalities. Oxford University Press, 2013.
[67] The distinctively-human mind: the many
pillars of cumulative culture. In G.Hatfield and H.Pittman (eds.), The Evolution of Mind, Brain, and
Culture. Penn Museum Press, 2013. [written in 2007]
[66] The emergence of metacognition: affect and uncertainty in animals. (With Brendan Ritchie.) In M.Beran, J.Brandl, J.Perner, and J.Proust (eds.), Foundations of Metacognition. OUP, 2012.
[65] Metacognition and reasoning. (With Logan Fletcher.) Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences, 367 (2012), 1366-1378.
[64]
The origins of creativity. (With
Elizabeth Picciuto.) In E. Paul and S. Kaufman, The
Philosophy of Creativity. Oxford University Press, 2012.
[63] Creative action in mind. Philosophical
Psychology, 24 (2011), 347-361.
[62] Language in cognition. In E.Margolis, R.Samuels, and S.Stich (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of
Cognitive Science. OUP, 2011.
[61] Moral responsibility and consciousness. (With Matt King.) Journal of Moral Philosophy, 9 (2012), 200-228.
[60] Descriptive Experience Sampling: What is it Good For? (With Mark Engelbert.) Journal of Consciousness Studies 18:1 (2011), 130-149. (Commentary on Describing Inner Experience? by Russell Hurlburt and Eric Schwitzgebel.)
[59]
Animal mentality: its character,
extent, and moral significance. In R. Frey and T. Beauchamp (eds.), Handbook
on Ethics and Animals. OUP, 2011.
[58] Against the moral standing of animals. In C. Morris (ed.), Practical Ethics: questions of life and death. OUP, 2011.
[57] The case against
cognitive phenomenology. (With Bénédicte
Veillet.) In T.Bayne
and M.Montague (eds.), Cognitive Phenomenology.
OUP, 2011.
[56] Consciousness, higher-order
theories of. In Edward Zalta (ed.), The
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. (2001 / 2007 / 2011).
[55] Introspection: divided and partly eliminated. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 80 (2010), 76-111.
[54] Introspection. (With Mark Engelbert.) Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Cognitive Science, 1 (2010), 245-253.
[53] Mindreading underlies metacognition. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32 (2009), 164-176. (A reply to 28 peer commentaries on [52] below.) To access a copy of the complete BBS exchange, including [53] & [52] together with the commentaries, click here.
[52] How we know our own minds: the relationship between mindreading and metacognition. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32 (2009), 121-138.
[51] Action-awareness and the active mind. Philosophical Papers 38 (2009), 133-156.
[50] An architecture for dual
reasoning. In J.Evans and K.Frankish
(eds.), In Two Minds: dual processes and beyond. OUP, 2009.
[49]
Invertebrate concepts confront the
Generality Constraint (and win). In R. Lurz
(ed.), The Philosophy of Animal Minds. CUP, 2009.
[48] Meta-cognition in animals: a skeptical look. Mind
and Language, 23 (2008), 58-89.
[47]
Précis of The Architecture of the Mind
& On Fodor-fixation,
flexibility, and human uniqueness. Mind and Language, 23
(2008), 257-262 & 293-303.
[46] Simulation and the first person. Philosophical Studies 144 (2008), 467-475. (Commentary on Simulating Minds by Alvin Goldman.)
[45] Evolution and the possibility of moral realism. (With Scott James.) Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 77 (2008), 237-244. (Commentary on The Evolution of Morality, by Richard Joyce.)
[44] Cartesian epistemology: is the theory of the self-transparent mind innate? Journal of Consciousness Studies 15 (4) (2008), 28-53.
[43] The Phenomenal Concept Strategy.
(With Bénédicte Veillet.)
Journal of Consciousness Studies 14 (2007), 212-236.
[42] The illusion of conscious will. Synthese, 159 (2007), 197-213.
[41] Invertebrate minds: a challenge for ethical theory. Journal of Ethics, 11 (2007), 275-297. Click here for pdf.
[40] The creative-action theory of creativity. In Carruthers, Laurence, and Stich (eds.), The Innate Mind 3: foundations and the future. OUP, 2007.
[39] Why pretend? In S. Nichols (ed.), The
Architecture of the Imagination. OUP, 2006.
[38] Simple heuristics meet massive modularity. In
Carruthers, Laurence, and Stich (eds.), The Innate Mind 2: culture and
cognition. OUP, 2006.
[37] The case for massively modular models of mind.
In R.Stainton (ed.), Contemporary Debates in
Cognitive Science. Blackwell, 2006.
[36] Conscious experience versus conscious thought. In U. Kriegel and K. Williford (eds.), Consciousness and Self-Reference. MIT, 2006.
[35] Distinctively
human thinking: modular precursors and components. In P.Carruthers,
S.Laurence, and S.Stich
(eds.), The Innate Mind: structure and content. OUP, 2005. Click here for pdf.
[34] Dual-Content Theory: the explanatory advantages. In my Consciousness:
Essays from a Higher-Order Perspective, ch.6. OUP, 2005.
[33] Reductive explanation and the
"explanatory gap". Canadian Journal of Philosophy,
34 (2004), 153-173. Click here for pdf.
[32]
HOP over FOR, HOT theory. In R.Gennaro
(ed.), Higher Order Theories of Consciousness. John Benjamins, 2004.
[31] Practical
reasoning in a modular mind. Mind and Language, 19 (2004),
259-278. Click here for pdf.
[30]
Suffering without subjectivity.
Philosophical Studies, 121 (2004), 99-125. Click here for pdf.
[28]
Why the question of animal
consciousness might not matter very much. Philosophical Psychology,
17 (2004), 83-102. Click here for pdf.
[26] On Fodor's Problem. Mind and Language,
18 (2003), 502-523. Click here for
pdf.
[25] Is the mind a
system of modules shaped by natural selection? In C. Hitchcock (ed.), Contemporary
Debates in the Philosophy of Science.
Blackwell, 2003.
[24] Moderately massive modularity. In A. O’Hear (ed.), Mind and Persons. CUP,
2003.
[23] Modularity, language, and the flexibility of thought. Behavioral
and Brain Sciences, 25:6 (2002), 705-719. (Published in 2003.) (Replies
to commentators on [22].)
For
the complete BBS exchange, including
both [22] and [23], click here.
[22] The
cognitive functions of language. Behavioral and Brain Sciences,
25:6, (2002), 657-674. (Published in 2003.)
[21] Human
creativity: its evolution, its cognitive basis, and its connections with
childhood pretence. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science,
53 (2002), 225-249. Click here for pdf.
[20] The roots of
scientific reasoning: infancy, modularity, and the art of tracking. In P.Carruthers, S.Stich and M.Siegal (eds.), The Cognitive Basis of Science. CUP,
2002.
[19] Precis of Phenomenal Consciousness and
replies to critics. (Replies to: Colin Allen, Jose Bermudez, Joseph Levine, and
William Seager.) Philosophy of Mind Book Forums (2001). http://www.swif.uniba.it/lei/mind/forums/forum2.htm
(Later published in Anthropology and Philosophy, 2005.)
[18] Consciousness:
explaining the phenomena. In D.Walsh (ed.), Naturalism,
Evolution and Mind. CUP, 2001.
[17] Replies to critics: explaining
subjectivity. Psyche, 6 (2000). (Replying to ten refereed articles in the
same journal targeted on [13].)
[15] Sympathy
and subjectivity. Australasian Journal of Philosophy,
77 (1999), 465-482. Click here
for pdf.
[14] Thinking
in language?: evolution and a modularist possibility.
In P.Carruthers and J.Boucher
(eds.), Language and Thought. CUP, 1998.
[13] Animal subjectivity. Psyche
4 (1998). (Long abstract and
reworking of phenomenal consciousness article #[2], to provide a target paper
for a special issue of the journal devoted to animal consciousness.)
[12] Natural
theories of consciousness. European Journal of Philosophy, 6
(1998), 203-222. Click here
for pdf.
[11] Conscious thinking: language or elimination? Mind & Language 13 (1998), 323-342. Click here for pdf.
[10] Autism as mind-blindness: an elaboration and partial defense. In P.Carruthers and P.K.Smith (eds.), Theories of Theories of Mind. CUP, 1996.
[9] Simulation and self-knowledge: a defense of theory-theory. In P.Carruthers and P.K.Smith (eds.), Theories of Theories of Mind. CUP, 1996.
[8] Pretend play: is it meta-representational? (With Chris Jarrold, Jill Boucher, and Peter K Smith.) Mind and Language 9 (1994), 445-468.
[7] Consciousness and concepts. Aristotelian
Society Proceedings, supplementary volume 66 (1992), 41-59.
[6] What is Empiricism? Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, supp. vol. 64 (1990), 258-269.
[5] Brute experience. The Journal of Philosophy, 86 (1989), 63-79.
[4] Conceptual pragmatism. Synthese 73 (1987), 205-224.
[3] Russellian thoughts. Mind 96 (1987), 18-35.
[2] Eternal thoughts. Philosophical Quarterly 34 (1984), 186-204.
[1] Fragmentary sense. Mind 93 (1984), 351-369.